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The division of the Korean Peninsula was not a strictly Korean 
phenomenon; the partition was imposed on the Korean people mainly by 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflicting national inter-
ests of these two superpowers has perpetuated this division. However, 
historically the Soviet Union and the United States have not been the 
only powers concerned with the Korean Peninsula. As a strategic nexus 
of East Asia, Korea has served as a bridge and as an arena of competi-
tion and conflict for regional powers. 
In Korea's history there have been few periods in which its foreign 
policy has not been influenced by China and Japan. In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries Tsarist Russia also had an impact 
on Korea's foreign policy formulation. Korea's nominal independence 
came to an end in 1910 when it was annexed by Japan. From 1910 until 
the closing months of 1945, Korea provided food and raw materials for 
Imperial Japan's expanding economy. 
At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was divided at the 38th 
parallel to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops to the Soviets 
in the north and the Americans in the south. As tensions increase 




On September 17, 1947 the United States brought the problem of Korean 
partition before the United Nations General Assembly. Secretary of 
State Marshall explained to the General Assembly that bilateral negotia-
tions between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the 
question of a unified and independent Korea were at an impasse. 
Washington believed that only action by the General Assembly could bring 
about an acceptable solution to the Korean problem. 1 In response, the 
General Assembly on November 14, 1947 established a Temporary Commission 
on Korea to observe elections, advise elected Korean representatives on 
the establishment of a National Government, and advise the National 
Government in making the necessary arrangements for Korean independence. 
Elections were to be held not later than March 31, 1948 on the basis of 
adult suffrage and by secret ballot. 
From the first meeting in January 1948, the Commission had diffi-
culty contacting the Soviet Military Command in the North. This 
situation was appealed to Secretary-General Lie, who confirmed the 
negative attitude of the Soviet Union toward cooperation with the 
Commissiono 2 The situation continued to polarize, with the major powers 
supporting the governments within their occupation zones; each government 
claimed to be the legitimate government of all Korea and worked to expand 
its control over the entire peninsula. After almost five years of 
uneasy coexistence, the possibility for a diplomatic solution to the 
Korean problem was shattered when North Korean forces crossed the 38th 
111 Address Before the United Nations General Assembly by George 
Marshall , 11 United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 17 
(Washington, D.C., September 28, 1947), p. 620 
2Leland Goodrich, Korea: fl Study of United States Policy .i!!. the 
United Nations (New York, 1956), pp. 33~43. 
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parallel on June 25, 1950. This Bction.precipitated the struggle 
between the United .. Nations forces, largely composed of American mater-
ials and men, and the North .Korean .and Communist Chinese forces equipped 
by the Soviet Union. After three years of fighting an armistice was 
signed in 1953 roughly preserving the pre-warboundaries. 
The foreign policies of both Koreas have continued to be influenced 
by the changing international equilibrium and the interaction of this 
international environment with regional priorities. This study analyzes 
and documents the changes in South Korean foreign policy as it relates 
to the problem of rapprochement with North Korea. 
Since a state's foreign policy is the product of external as well 
as internal conditions, the shifting policies of the great powers as 
they have influenced regional politics over the past decade will be 
analyzed. The time span will correspond roughly to the period of Park 
Chung-hee 1 s leadership in South Korea (1962 to the present). During 
this decade major policy reorientations have occurred on both regional 
and extra-regional levels. The United States has modified containment 
as its major policy in Asia and diplomatic negotiations have been 
established with the People's Republic of China. 3 Japan and South 
Korea have normalized their relations after twenty years of mistrust and 
tension. Treaty arrangements between Japan and South Korea have facili-
tated the introduction of Japanese capital into South Korea in a new 
spirit of cooperation between these two countries. 4 
3Park Chung-hee, To Build.! Nation (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 147 
411 Korea, Japan Normalizes Relations, 11 Korean Report, Vol. 5 
(October - December 1965), p. 5. 
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Relations on the regional and international levels were rendered more 
complex by the Sino~soviet rift, Soviet.development of Siberia and the 
Maritime Province, and Communist .China.'s increased involvement with non-
communist states. By the early seventies, these events had precipitated 
a restructuring of relations in Northeast Asia which forced South Korea 
to reorient both its domestic and foreign policies in an attempt to 
reconcile itself to these new pressures on the international scene. 
This study poses several fundamental questions which events of the 
past decade suggest. First, what is the extent of South Korea's inter-
action with regional and extra-regional powers? Second, what implica-
tions does a lessening of tensions on the international level have on 
South Korean domestic and foreign policies? Third, does the lessening 
of tensions between the great powers provide an atmosphere of rapproche-
ment on the regional level strong enough to provide an impetus for a 
normalization of relations between North and South Korea? 
The changing world situation influences the answers to these 
questions, and within a regional context, the Republic of Korea has to 
consider a number of external factors in formulating its policy deci-
sions. The first factor is the emergence of new power concentrations in 
Northeast Asia. One aspect of this problem is China•s massive conven-
tional capability and its emerging nuclear arsenal especially within the 
Asian region. As a result of the Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet Union has 
deployed fourty-four divisions in this area to counterbalance China's 
massive conventional advantage and to protect the Soviet's interest in 
the development of resources in Siberia and the Maritime Province. In 
addition to this ground build-up, the Soviets have a world wide naval 
capability which increasingly has been seen in the waters off Siberia 
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and the Maritime Province. 
On the economic p 1 ane, Japan has .. achieved . economic dominance within 
the region. Japan has substantial investments in South Korea and 
accounts for over 50 percent of all South Korean trade. Japan's search 
for new markets has brought about increased diplomatic and trade con-
tacts with both China and North Korea at the expense of Japanese 
investment in South Korea. The South Korean government has been upset 
over Japanese overtures in this direction because such actions have had 
a detrimental effect on the South Korean economy. As trade between 
communist and.non-communist nations increase, South Korea must ulti-
mately reevaluate its trade .policy with communist countries or face the 
possibility of becoming isolated in a changing international environ-
ment. 5 
The second major factor is the United States' disengagement from 
the area as stated by President Nixon in his Guam pronouncement of July 
1969. The Nixon Doctrine called for a reduction of United States forces 
in the Asian-Pacific region and implied that no further American forces 
were to be dispatched to that region. Moreover, Asians were expected 
to assume the responsibility for their own conventiQnal defenses. 
Future military aid was to be determined by the United States on a case 
by case basis. Accordingly, the United States' military profile in the 
region was to be lowered and it was to reduce its aid to Asian govern-
ments in their struggles against insurgents. Finally, under the terms 
of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States was to maintain its commitments 
5voung C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1973), 
p. 50. 
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as defined by treaties and agreements in the region. 6 
South Korea's dilemma arises from the first set of factors, namely 
the increasing influence within the region of China and the Soviet 
Union. Both of these powers have been viewed as ideological enemies of 
South Korea and allies of North Korea. The second factor establishes 
a trend toward decreasing American power in the area and an increasing 
unwillingness to become militarily involved. This reduces the American 
credibility as a force capable of maintaining tranquility on the Korean 
peninsula. 
This study will analyze South Korea's reactions to external 
pressures within the regional power structure and the effect on Korean 
rapprochement. 
The following hypothesis will be used to formulate an analytical 
structure to aid in developing the research questions: A reduction of 
tensions between extra-regional powers on an international level reduces 
tensions between their respective client states on a regional level and 
allows them to divert their energies to furthering their national 
interest. Such a reduction of tensions also limits the extent to which 
extra-regional powers may determine the national interest of their 
respective client states. 
Both North and South Korea have become increasingly suspicious of 
the detente policies of the major powers. The thawing of relations 
between the Soviet Union and the United States and the People's Republic 
of China and the United States has raised doubts about the viability of 
old commitments. Both North and South Korea are concerned about the 
possibility that their national interests might be sacrificed in the 
6oonald Hellmann, Japan and East Asia (New York, 1972), p. 25. 
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name of great power rapprochement. This concern about affairs on the 
dominant system level has led to the establishment of a dialogue on the 
subordinant system level between North and South Korea. In conjunction 
with this dialogue, both states have increased their cross bloc contacts 
in an effort to obtain security and bargaining power for their indi-
vidual positions in regional and international negotiations. Korean 
rapprochement can be viewed as a strategy aimed at preventing decisions 
to resolve the Korean problem by the great powers at the expense of 
either Korean client state. 
The key terms which will be used in this study are: international 
level, extra-regional power, bipolar world and national interest. 
International level can be defined as that level of interaction where 
activities extend beyond the boundaries of a single national political 
community. It can more precisely be described as international 
politics. 7 The study of international politics can be divided into 
three levels: first, the single core unit (nation-state or micro-
analytical level). Second, the subordinate system level which focuses 
8 on the interaction of core units within a regional context, and thirdly 
the dominant system level which would be synonymous with the internation-
al system. The dominant system level could be called the sum of 
relations in all subordinate systems and the effects these interactions 
have on the international system. Harold Sprout compares these inter-
actions to the ripple effect produced by tossing a pebble into a still 
pond; policy reorientation on the dominant level causes policy shifts on 
7Harold Sprout, "Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspec-
tive," World Politics, Vol. 15 (October, 1962 - July, 1963) p. 188. 
8For the purpose of this study Northeast Asia will be defined to 
include the Korean peninsula and those states in close proximity to this 
area (the Soviet Union, China, and Japan). 
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the subordinate systems levels which in turn require changes in foreign 
policy by the core units within the subordinate system. This reaction 
can also be caused by a shift in policy at the core unit level causing 
a reorientation at successive higher levels. Each action produces a 
reaction which is then reacted to by the initial actor, thus producing 
a ripple effect. 9 
South Korean attitudes toward rapprochement will be analyzed within 
a framework of international, regional, and nation-state policy inter-
actions. Within such a framework, a power which exercises influence 
outside its subsystem will be termed an extra-regional power. In 
practice an extra-regional power could operate in a number of subordinate 
systems. The term extra-regional power implies the ability to operate 
in a global environment with a global foreign policy which influences 
subsequent subordinate system levels and core units within these 
levels. lO 
The term client state is descriptive of the relations which both 
Koreas maintain with their respective extra-regional powers. As a 
result of various kinds of conflicts which occur on the three levels of 
the international system, the interacting system of states tends to be 
polarized by alliances made by individual states. In today 1s system 
these alliances are dominated by a single power from whom these allies 
obtain military and economic benefits in return for support on general 
. f l" d" t" 11 issues o po icy irec 1on. 
9 Sprout, p. 218. 
10James Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York, 1969), p. 29. 
11 J. R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, Alliance in 
International Politics (Boston, 1970), p. 105. 
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In the context of this study John Hertz's definition of a bipolar 
world is used in reference to a situation in which only two powers have 
a nuclear monopoly, and the deyelopment of weapons and delivery systems 
requires the establishment of spheres of influence with forward areas 
of troops stationed at or near their rim and bases lining their 
frontiers. 12 The division of Korea occurred under these circumstances. 
However, in terms of this strict definition today's world is in a state 
of flux. It can no longer be called a truly bipolar world, since a 
number of new powers have joined the nuclear club. It is true that 
these powers do not measure up to the vast power potential of the United 
States or the Sov~et Union; however, they exercise enough influence to 
create a multipolar subordinate system in a regional context. Aside 
from the nuclear aspects of the definition, states are also influenced 
by independent powers and economic blocs who apply international 
pressures that are out of proportion to their true military capabilities. 
Both military and economic factors play a role in foreign policy formu-
lation" Hertz attributes the demise of bipolarity to the joint effect 
of the spread of technological know-how and of nationalism. He hypothe-
sizes that bipolarity has given way to multipolarity through nuclear 
proliferation. 
National interest refers to those actions taken by a state to 
protect its geographic, political and cultural identity against encroach-
ments by other nations. Hans Morgenthau states that the survival of a 
political unit, much as a state, is the irreducible minimum, the most 
necessary element of its interests vis-a-vis other nations. National 
12 James Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy (New 
York, 1969), p. 79. 
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interest assumes uninterputed conflict and the threat of war, to be 
minimized through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by 
diplomatic action. A state's national interest must be constantly 
defended against the national interests of other nations. 13 As the 
international environment changes, the tactics used by states to achieve 
their national interest also change. In the context of this study 
national interest will encompass all of the factors which determine a 
state's actions on the international scene in order to preserve that 
state's identity. 
In the final analysis foreign policy can be viewed as a variable 
which is dependent on four pattern factors within the subordinate 
system. These pattern factors which determine foreign policy are 
cohesion, communication, political potential and the structure of 
relations. Cohesion can be broken down into four sub-factors on the 
social, economic, political and organizational levels. Cohesion would 
determine the degree of interaction between the units within the sub-
ordinate system. And the structure of relations would define which 
states are cooperating or in conflict. 14 
The assessment of these pattern factors will aid in the computation 
of data which will help determine the foreign policy direction of the 
core unit. Cohesion and communication are quantitative variables while 
13Hans Morgenthau, 11Another Great Debate: The National Interest 
of the United States, 11 in David Mclellan, William Olsin, and Fred 
Sondermann (ed.), The T~eory and Practice of International Relations 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1960 , pp. 181-186. 
14louis Cantori, and Steven Spiegel, 11 International Regions: A 
Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems, 11 in David Mclellan, 
William Olson, and Fred Sondermann (ed.), The Theory and Practice of 
International Relations, Fourth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, 1974), 
pp. 448-454. 
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political potential and structure of relations are normative variables. 
In this particular case the sum of these variables will determine the 
foreign policy outlook of a core unit. 
The structural foundation for this study was extracted from a 
number of significant .works relating to international relations. 
Thomas W. Robinson's article, 11A .National Interest Analysis of Sino-
Soviet Relations, 11 originally appearing in International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 11 (June, 1967), was particularly useful. It focused 
on national interest as it is used to interpret and explain the goals 
of foreign policy. A complementary essay by Hans Morgenthau entitled 
"Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States, 11 
appearing in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 46 (1952), 
helped to further clarify the precise meaning of the term national 
interest. 
The essay written by Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, "Inter-
national Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems, 11 
published in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1969), provided 
the framework for the comparison of regional international relations. 
While the model to test these propositions about the interdependence of 
regional and international systems was gleaned from 11The Global System 
and Its Subsystems: A Developmental View, 11 by J. David Singer and 
"Toward the Study of National-International Linkages, 11 by James Rosenau. 
Both of these essays were published in Linkage Politics (Free Press, 
1969). While Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer's essay 11Multipolar 
Power Systems and International Stability, 11 appearing in World Politics, 
Vol. 16 (1964), aided in conceptualizing how the change in global 
politics, from a bipolar to a multipolar system, has effected 
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international relations. On the regional level the role of the small 
state was developed from the model presented in Small States in 
International Relations (Wiley Interscience Division, 1971), edited by 
August Schou. The function of a more specific small state within the 
international framework is presented in Major Powers and Korea (Research 
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), edited by Young C. Kim. 
i 
Aside from these sources, the present and recently suspended 
constitution will be analyzed to determine whether significant deviation 
within the structural framework are consistent with the goal of Korean 
rapprochement. Policy pronouncements appearing in the English language 
daily, the Korea Herald, and such journals as the Korean Research Center 
Bulletin and the Korean Quarterly will be also analyzed in order to 
explain government policy shifts. In combination with these sources 
published in South Korea, other secondary sources will be utilized. 
These secondary sources include such professional journals as the Far 
East Survey, Pacific Affairs, International Organization, Asian Survey 
and World Politics. The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor and 
the State Department Bulletin were examined for pertinent materials. 
This study will utilize the case study method to focus on the core 
unit and its relationship to the subordinate and dominant system levels 
in foreign policy determination. The scope of this paper will be limited 
to those aspects of South Korean foreign policy which are concerned with 
the restructuring of relations on the Korean peninsula. 
This study will utilize the historical-analytical method to under-
stand the problem of Korean rapprochement. Content analysis of speeches, 
documents and meetings will be made and then analyzed to discover signi-
ficant trends in this direction. Some quantitative data will be 
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utilized to support the interpretation of these trends in such areas as 
cohesion and communication. 
Lovell's historic perspective will be used to provide an organiza-
tional model for this study. This perspective provides the following 
structural framework: 
1. spatial relationships 
2. patterns of supply and demand 
3. patterns of authority 
4. rules of the game. 
Within this structure certain questions will be answered concerning 
South Korea's external orientation, her foreign policy autonomy, her 
objectives, status and role within the subordinate system, and levels 
of conflict and cohesion within the system. 
Chapter II provides the setting for the structure of the subordin-
ate system, and examines the effects of the changes of policy at the 
dominant level on the subordinate level and the core unit, South Korea. 
Chapter Ill analyzes South Korea's responses to the policy reorien-
tation within the subordinant system due to the influence of the extra-
regional powerso 
Chapter IV examines the possibility of Korean reunificationo The 
changing international environment will be considered in terms of South 
Korea's national interesto 
Chapter V assesses the prospects for rapprochement from the stand-
point of regional and extra-regional interests and makes concluding 
observations. 
The topic of Korean rapprochement is related to changes on the 
international scene. By taking a specific problem and examining the 
14 
interaction of pressures on the various levels of the international 
system a better understanding of the region might be accomplished. The 
subordinate system focus performs several functions: first a systems 
approach sets limits to the foreign policy choices of all actors within 
it. It points out the fact that a state's foreign policy is the product 
of external as well as internal conditions. Second, this approach helps 
to clarify actions taken by a state on a level lower than the dominant 
system focus. The international system is composed of individual states 
which act and re-act; the dominant system focus distorts these actions 
if they do not conform to the bloc system. Therefore, by studying the 
subordinate system it is hoped that a contribution can be made to the 
understanding of international relations on both a regional and an inter-
national level. 
The current nature of events under discussion in this paper limit 
the availability of source material. This factor, in conjunction with 
the author's inability to read Korean, has presented difficulties in 
researching this topic. However, the unusually close relationship which 
exists between Korean and American intellectual communities have made 
English translations of major Korean policy pronouncements readily 
available through scholarly journals. A certain amount of rhetoric 
exists in these government sponsored translations; however a careful 
analysis of the documents in relation to events unfolding on the inter-
national scene should enable one to sort rhetoric from reality. 
CHAPTER II 
STRUCTURE OF RELATIONS ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The Sino-Soviet conflict, great power rapprochement, the emergence 
of an increasingly independent Japanese foreign policy, and the trend 
toward a reduced American military role in Northeast Asia are important 
factors influencing the evolution of a new four-power balance on the 
dominant system level. 1 The scope of this study does not include an in 
depth analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict or great power rapprochement. 
However, since both of these factors have had a major impact on the 
restructuring of relations on the international level, and therefore an 
indirect influence on the Korean situation, a brief synopsis is in 
order. 
The Sino-Soviet dispute shattered the myth of a monolithic commun-
ist bloc. Harold Hinton states that the Soviet and Chinese peoples are 
as xenophobic as most and that each includes the other among the major 
objects of its dislike. His research shows that this feeling has been 
growing stronger rather than weaker since the early 1950's. On the 
Soviet side, there is a yellow peril mentality that has come to embrace 
the Chinese since 1949. This fear was substantiated by Dr. Wilhelm 
Starlinger, a German physicain, on the basis of extensive contacts with 
1This emerging balance of power in Northeast Asia includes China, 
Japan, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. 
15 
16 
Soviet officials imprisoned in Stalin's concentration camps. He con-
cluded that a fear of China and an apprehension of possible Chinese 
demographic pressures on Soviet territory were widespread in the Soviet 
Union. On the Chinese side, .both .Tsarist and Communist Russia have 
been seen as appropriators of Inner Asian territories that once belonged 
to China and as a power historically ready to take advantage of any 
weakness in China to make further demands. Hinton suggests that it was 
essentially to compensate for the embarrassing fact that it was a power 
with such an unfavorable image upon which the Chinese Communist regime 
was making itself dependent for support that Peking launched a pro-
Sovi et propaganda campaign of enormous proportions in 1950. It is very 
likely that the disengagement from Soviet influence after 1958 and the 
emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute into the open shortly afterward 
were greeted with approval by the Chinese public and tended to increase 
Peking 1 s popular support. 
More important than popular attitudes is the fact that China, 
because of its size and peculiar history, is the only Communist state 
to have, or feel that it has, major unsatisfied claims for status, over 
and above its urge toward territorial unification. In addition, it is 
the only Communist state or party outside the Soviet Union to have a 
leader who, since Stalin 1 s death, has thought of himself as the leading 
figure in the international Communist movement. 
Beyond the profound cultural differences between them, the Soviet 
Union and China are at different stages of development. The Soviet 
Union is at least a generation ahead, more of a satisfied power, and 
more defensive and less revolutionary in its nationalism. China, on the 
other hand, is an emerging power still looking for its place in the sun. 
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To a large extent, as the result of Mao Tse-tung•s great political 
influence in China, the two political systems have been moving in 
different directions. Even the trend in the Soviet Union, since 
Khrushchev 1 s fall, away from his liberalizing tendencies toward partial 
re-Stalinization, in the shape of more stringent police and bureaucratic 
controls and less freedom of expression, has not tended to bring Moscow 
into political alignment with Peking. The trend in China in recent 
years has been away from bureaucratic controls and toward spontaneity. 2 
I 
In the final analysis it can be said that three major factors 
brought about the Sino-Soviet dispute: first, the historical-
psycological factor; second, a desire to regain lost territories; and 
finally a basic ideological dispute on how to achieve the ultimate ends 
of the communist revolution. 
It has been generally accepted that the Sino-Soviet dispute 
expanded the pattern of great power interrelationships into a triangle. 
Within this triangle China views the Soviet Union as a newly established 
world power, while the United States is viewed as a declining power. 
The Soviet 1 s seem to view the United States in the same light but they 
regard the People 1 s Republic of China as a newly emerging power with 
great potential. This triangular view of great power relationships 
destroys the bipolar world concept. A loss of American prestige is no 
longer an automatic gain for Moscow. Peking now becomes a factor in 
the loss/gain analysis. It is this new environment which has brought 
about the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
2Harold Hinton, China 1 s Turbulent Quest (New York, 1970), 
pp. 206-207. 
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and the People's Republic of China and .the United States. 3 
In the past, systems of world order based on collaboration among 
the great powers have nearly always been based on an overriding fear of 
war. As in the past conflict is present in today's international system. 
However, it seems that the present rapprochement is more the result of 
the fear and mistrust that the Soviet Union and China have for one 
another. A second factor seems to be the crisis which exists in 
American foreign policy. For domestic support, if for no other reason, 
a fundamental adjustment of American policy objectives was seen as 
necessary in the aftermath of Vietnam. That adjustment was based in 
part upon the reduction of the American role abroad. For these reasons, 
a policy designed to persuade allies and adversaries to pursue goals and 
take actions which were in the American interest as well as their own 
evolved, 4 This concept was at the root of the Soviet-American and Sino-
American contacts, and these contacts were facilitated by the Sino-
Soviet dispute. 
These same forces were at work influencing changes in Japanese 
foreign policy. As the United States increased contacts with the Soviet 
Union and China, Japan also began to reassess its relations with these 
countries. The resulting interactions created a quadrilateral pattern 
in Northeast Asia. Japan, the United States, China and the Soviet Union 
all had a stake in the continuing stability of that area. 
This changing atmosphere in the international system has produced 
increased interactions among powers on the dominant and subordinate 
3Alan M. Jones (ed.), United States Foreign Policy .i!!_~ Changing 
World (New York, 1973), p. 121. 
4 I bi d . , p . 64 . 
levels. 5 The plenitude of interacting parties on the dominant and 
subordinate levels resemble a multipolar system structure. Individual 
states have associations with a variety of others, both regionally and 
internationally; there is a trend to cross-cut loyalties which results 
in reduced hostility expressed toward any particular state or against 
any particular cause. As this structure emerges, no one state within 
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the system can afford to express hostility toward another state, because 
it may respond by consolidating its connections with other states 
equally as powerful as the first state. 6 
As a result of this new quadrilateral pattern, the Republic of 
Korea has been forced to reassess its situation, interests, and policies. 
Ironically, South Korea's chief benefactor, the United States, has been 
instrumental in bringing about these changes on the dominant system 
level. As the international environment begins to alter old relation-
ships, South Korea must respond by reorienting its foreign policy to 
these new changes, or run the risk of isolating itself from the new 
world environment. 
Seoul 1 s first indication of a major American policy readjustment 
occurred in 1969, when President Nixon first enunciated the Guam or 
Nixon Doctrine. South Korea wasted no time attempting to clarify the 
impact of this policy pronouncement on American troop commitments in 
South Korea. In August, 1969, President Park Chung-hee arrived in San 
Francisco to consult with President Nixon on the implications of this 
5ooak Barnett, 11 The New Multi-polar Balance in East Asia: 
Implications for United States Policy, 11 Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), 
p. 73. 
6J. R. Friedman et al. (eds.), Alliance in International Politics 
(Boston, 1970), pp. 49-50. 
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new policy. These meetings resulted .in a pledge by both Presidents 
that their governments would live up to their mutual defense agreements. 
President Park was satisfied .with President Nixon's sincerity, and 
apparently nothing was mentioned .about possible American troop reduc-
tions in South Korea. 7 
In spite of President .Nixon 1s assurances South Korea received two 
serious shocks in 1970, which telegraphed the message that the United 
States-Korean Alliance could no longer be unquestioningly relied on as 
the cornerstone of that nation 1 s foreign policy. On the economic level 
it was learned that the United States was going to impose textile 
quotas; although the action was not specifically aimed at South Korea, 
it would cost it 100 million dollars annually. This figure would amount 
to more than Seoul had received from Washington in aid in any year since 
the introduction of the first five-year plan in 1962. 8 Coupled with this 
economic shock was the announcement that the United States intended to 
withdraw troops from South Korea. The United States made this announce-
ment unilaterally, without prior discussion with the Seoul government. 
And finally, to add insult to injury, the United States Ambassador to 
Korea publicly announced that Koreans should shoulder more of their 
defense costs. The timing of Ambassador Porter 1 s announcement could not 
have been worse. Not only did it fail to take into account the fact 
that Seoul had substantially increased its share of the defense burden 
711 Statements by Park Chung-hee on his visit to the United States, 11 
Department 2.f. State Bulletin, Vol. 61, pt. l (July-September, 1969), 
pp. 242-243, 
8Park Chung-hee, To Build.! Nation (Washington, D.C., 1971), 
p. l 07. 
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on a graduated basis in proportion to .its economic growth, but it also 
seemed somewhat ironical in .view of the large costs South Korea was 
being forced to carry simultaneously with the American troop withdrawals 
and the imposition of textile quotas. The total cost of these two 
measures was estimated to be as much as one third to one half of the 
Korean National Budget. 9 
To demonstrate that a continuing American commitment to South Korea 
still existed, United States Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited 
Seoul in July, 1970. Laird's mission was to reassure the South Korean 
government that Washington had no intention of abandoning its ally on 
the Korean peninsula. In a joint communique issued at the end of the 
United States-Korean Security Consultative Meetings, Laird stressed the 
United States government's readiness and determination to render assis-
tance to South Korea in the event of any future emergencies. The 
American government also promised substantial aid to help step-up the 
five-year modernization program of the South Korean armed forces 
following the reduction of United States forces in South Korea by 
20,000 men. This formula left 43,000 American troops in South Korea. 
By June of 1971 , the 7th Division had 1 eft South Korea and troops from 
the 2nd Division were in the process of being replaced by Republic of 
Korea forces along the demilitarized zone, leaving the entire 151 mile 
truce border manned by the South Korean Army. 10 
To underscore the American government's position on South Korea, 
9Joungwon Alexander Kim, 11 The Republic of Korea: A Quest for New 
Directions, 11 Asian Survey, Vol. II, pt. II (1971), pp. 94-95. 
1011 South Korea, 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 1972 Yearbook (Hong 
Kong, 1972), p. 291. -
22 
Secretary of State Rogers announced before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations that .Korea provtded a good test case for the Nixon 
Doctrine• s emphasis on .local forces progressively taking over local 
defense. He particularly stressed the point that the United States was 
not going to abandon Korea and Rogers made reference to Lai rd' s Korean 
visit during which he had assured Seoul that the United States would 
stand by its treaty commitments. 11 
Even Vice-President Agnew made a five day stop in South Korea in 
June of 197l·in an effort to make the Republic of Korea government feel 
less abandoned as events unfolded on the international scene. 
Not long after Vice-President Agnew left South Korea, Seoul was 
surprised by the July, 1971 announcement of President Nixon's trip to 
China. The result of President Nixon's trip was the Shanghai Communique, 
which pledged both China and the United States to support efforts on the 
Korean peninsulaaimed at a relaxation of tension and increased communi-
cation between the two Koreas. 12 
Again Washington's actions were a source of confusion to South 
Korean policy makers, Not only was Washington mending its fences with 
the Soviet Union, through increased dialogue and expanding trade rela-
tions, but it was also attempting to restructure its relations with the 
People's Republic of China. South Korean policy makers had received 
what they thought to be assurances of solid support for their positions. 
However, actions by the United States on the international level, aimed 
1111Sec. of State Rogers (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Speech, Dec. 10, 1970), 11 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 64 
(January - March, 1971), p. 23. 
1211America and Asia, 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 (July 9, 
1973)' p. 6. 
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at lessening tensions, seemed contradictory to American commitments at 
the regional level. 
In addition to South Korea '_s_ .clo.se relationship with the United 
States, it had also established .close ties with Japan. Seoul first 
normalized its relations with Tokyo in.June of 1965 with the signing of 
the Treaty on Basic Relations. This treaty culminated fourteen years 
of negotiations and resolved most of the outstanding differences between 
these two countries. The main advantage derived from the Treaty on 
Basic Relations was the opening of South Korea to Japanese investments. 
Under this settlement Japanese government grants of goods and services 
worth 300 million dollars were to be made payable over a ten year period. 
In addition to these government grants and credits, Japan also agreed 
to expedite private deferred-payment loans at commercial rates to 
private enterprises in Korea up to a total of the yen equivalent of 300 
million dollars. All this loan and investment activity was regarded by 
most observers in Seoul as the beginning of a much greater involvement 
of Japanese enterprise in Korea, on an equity or license-and-loan basis 
or some combination of such arrangements. 13 
This was the beginning of postwar Japanese economic entrenchment 
in South Korea. The military presence of the United States in South 
Korea relieved Japanese leaders from any serious concern with South 
Korea's security .. Between 1965 and 1970 Japan 1 s economic involvement in 
South Korea grew, while Japan's economic relations with North Korea 
and China were minima1. 14 
13Lawrence Olson, Japan l..!!. Postwar Asia (New York, 1970), pp. 160-
163. 
14voung C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1973), p. 55. 
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South Korea's dependence on exports from the United States and 
Japan increased rapidly during _the period from 1969 to 1972. In these 
four years, as Chart 1 demonstrates, South Korea had critical balance 
of payment problems with bath countries. This economic dependence 
created political dependence, in that South Korea deemed it necessary 
not to alienate Japan and the United States, because it was dependent 
on these two countries for a high percentage of its foreign credit and 
military aid. Percentages computed from Chart 1, revealed that the 
United States received 55.25 percent of South Korea's exports in the 
years from 1969 until 1972, while Japan received 31 percent of all of 
South Korea's exports during the same time span. These two figures 
amount to 86.25 percent of South Korea's export trade with all OECD 
countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Countries). On the debit side of the ledger South Korean trade statis-
tics look even bleaker. Combined Japanese-United States exports to 
South Korea totaled about 89 percent of its total imports from all OECD 
countries. 
From these figures one can make a reasonable assumption that South 
~Korea has been dependent upon good trade relations with the United 
States and Japan. Therefore, it can be assumed that South Korea's policy 
orientation would be to maintain these relations because its economic 
stability is dependent upon them. 
One result of the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine for Asia was 
the Okinawa Revision Treaty of 1969, which called for the return of 
Okinawa to Japan in 1972. To secure this agreement Japan apparently 
made some concessions concerning security interests. Mr. Sato (Japan's 
Prime Minister at that time) declared: 
Chart South _Korean .Trade .Ftgures. 1969"'.' 197215 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
South Korean· ExEorts .to DECO Countriesa 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
Total Exports 40.9 58.4 71. 2 111. 5 
United States ImEorts From South Korea. 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
24.26 30.85 38.53 58.98 
JaEanese ImEorts From South Korea~ 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
11. 16 19.08 22.86 35.50 
South Korean ImEorts From OECD Countries. 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
Total Imports 141. 1 138.2 152.6 168. 1 
United States ExEorts to South Korea .. 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
58.28 53.06 56.78 61. 28 
JaEanese ExEorts to South Korea. 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
63.93 68. 18 71.29 81.65 
15statistics of Foreign Trade (Organization for Economic Co-
OEeration and DeveloEment Countries), Series A, Overall Trade by 




If an armed attack against the Republic of Koreawere to 
occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. 
Therefore, should an occasion arise-for United States 
forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and 
areas within Japan as bases for military-combat opera-
tions to meet the armed attack, the policy would be to 
decide its position positively and promptly.16 
26 
In effect what Prime Minister Sato said was that an armed attack on the 
Republic of Korea would seriously affect Japan's security, and Japan 
would be prompt in allowing United States forces use of bases in Japan. 
In 1969, when Japan made this statement, its sensitivity to Korean 
strategic considerations was chiefly motivated by the desire to retain 
South Korea as a market for Japanese goods and a source of much-needed 
farm commodities. Japan was relatively certain that it would not be 
called upon to live up to any vague declaration on Korean security. 
Japan's relaxed attitude toward the Korean situation was sustained by 
its assessment of a multiple set of interactions among the regional 
states. It felt that neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic 
of China desired war in Korea; North Korea was effectively restrained by 
these two countries. Meanwhile, South Korea was restrained by the 
United States• desire to prevent conflict on the peninsula. Neither the 
North or the South could wage a war on a sustained basis without assis-
tance, and this assistance was unlikely to come from the major powers 
involved in the area. None of the major powers wanted to see the basic, 
emerging structure of multipolarity endangered by renewed hostilities 
on the peninsula. Armed conflict between North and South Korea could 
possibly draw two or more of the major powers into direct confrontation, 
thus destroying the entire concept of achieving long-range stability in 
16R. Starry, "Options for Japan in the 1970 1 s, 11 World Today, Vol. 
26 (August, 1970), p. 328. 
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Northeast Asia through salidificatio.n _of a multipolar balance of power 
system. Japan, therefore, concluded that a military balance already 
existed in Korea which ... .would .allow .her to issue an official expression 
of solidarity with South .Korea without.risking any serious possibility 
of having to live up to such an agreement. This course of action would 
satisfy both the South Korean and United States governments of Japan's 
stand on the issue of South Korean security, In essence Japan's 
statement cost her very little, but it reaped maximum gain in terms of 
positive responses from both South Korea and the United States. 17 
The announcement of President Nixon's China trip and the resulting 
new China policy had many political repercussions in the world; among 
the most important was the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. As the inter-
national environment began to change in Northeast Asia, Japan rushed 
to establish economic and diplomatic ties with the People's Republic 
of China, 18 
Japan had carried on a limited trade with China prior to President 
Nixon's visit to Peking. The top business leaders of Japan had to keep 
their China trade on a low-priority basis, in an effort not to antagon-
ize their most important trading partner, the United States. In addition 
to this, Chou En-lai's April, 1970 China trade policy had limited the 
number of Japanese businesses in Peking. Four classes of Japanese firms 
were prohibited from trading with China: 
(1) those assisting Taiwan's attempt to reconquer China, or South 
Korea's attempt to invade North Korea; 
17voung C. Kim, p, 55. 
18Gene Msiao, 11 The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of 
Ambivalance, 11 China Quarterly, Vol. 57 (January - March, 1974), p. 101. 
(2) those with heavy .investments in Taiwan and South Korea; 
(3) those supplying arms to the .United States' war effort in 
Indochina; 
(4) and joint American-Japanese ventures and American 
b "d. . 19 su s1 iar1 es. 
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Manufacturers of products such as fertilizers, who had a huge market in 
China, and those with small economic interests in Taiwan and South 
Korea, accepted these conditions, but for over a year many large firms 
resisted the pressure to comply with them as the price for trading with 
China. 
The unexpected announcement of President Nixon's decision to visit 
the Chinese capital changed the situation dramatically. President 
Nixon's trip revealed the willingness of the American government to 
attempt to negotiate an accomodiation with the People's Republic of 
China. This diplomatic move by the United States ~as interpreted by 
Japan as a signal that the United States was changing its attitude 
about establishing relations with China. It was soon decided among the 
large Japanese companies that trade with China on a large scale would 
not result in retaliation from Washington. The Nippon Steel Corporation 
was among the first to give way. Other large trading firms, manufac~ 
turers of steel, machinery, transportation equipment, electronics, 
petro-chemicals, shipping firms, department stores and supermarkets, 
insurance companies, and banks followed suit. These firms were anxious 
not to miss out on the potentially huge China market. These new trade 
relations with China had an impact on Japanese-South Korean trade 
19Alexander Young, 11 Japan 1 s Trade With China: Impact of the Nixon 
Visit, 11 World Today, Vol. 28 (1972), p. 342. 
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relations. Many large Japanese. firms began to· reduce their investments 
in South Korea in accordance with Chou .En~l.ai 's conditions for expanding 
trade with China. Just how sensitive this topic had become was seen by 
the reluctance of Japanese businessmen to attend a private Joint Japan-
South Korean Economic Committee meeting in Tokyo in March of 1972. 20 
Japan's developing relations with the People's Republic of China 
irritated South Korea, but its relations with China were not half as 
vexing as Japan's two-Koreas policy. According to South Korea, Article 
III of the Treaty on Basic Relations binds Japan to fully recognize the 
ROK's assertion of jurisdictional control over the entire area of the 
Korea peninsula. Article III specifically states that Japan: "confirms 
that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful 
Government in Korea as specified in Resolution 195 (III) of the United 
Nations General Assembly. 1121 As a result of this recognition, the ROK 
maintains that Japan had admitted the illegality of the North Korean 
regime and was barred from establishing any official relations with 
North Korea. 
Taking issue with the. Soyth Korean government's interpretation of 
Article III, Japan stateq t.h~t as a member of the United Nations, it 
honors United Nations Resolution 195 (III) that the Republic of Korea 
is the only legitimate government and for that reason, not because of 
Article III, Japan would not establish diplomatic relations with North 
22 Korea. However, Japan reserved the right to trade with North Korea, 
20Ibid., p. 344. 
21 Kwan Bong Kim, The Korean-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability 
of the Korean Political System (New York, 1971), p. 42. 
22 Ibid,, pp. 42-54. 
and in fact had developed limited .trade relations with North Korea 
before the signing of the Treaty on .Basic Relations (Japan-South 
Korea). 23 
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Japan's North Korean trade policy has gone through a number of 
different stag es over the years •.. When trade with North Korea was first 
initiated, the Japanese government did not allow direct trade between 
the two countries. All trade was transacted through the medium of a 
third nation, in most cases France. The majority of the transactions 
were executed through the North European Commercial Bank in Paris. They 
acted as an intermediary between Japan and North Korea, arranging for 
the purchase, shipment, and paym~nt of goods. The practice of utilizing 
an intermediary was revoked in 1962, and thereafter it became Japanese 
policy to require government approval for commodities traded. Permis-
sion was granted to each company on the merit of each case. In this 
phase Japanese companies negotiated directly with the North Korean 
government; the Japanese government did not participate in any of 
these trade negotiations. For the next ten years this was the founda~ 
tion of the North Korean-Japanese trade relationships. North Korea-
Japanese trade relations have never approached the magnitude of South 
Korean-Japanese trade relations. 24 Chart 2 outlines the trade relations 
between Japan and North and South Korea between 1961 and 1965. 
23Japan has had some form of trade relationship with North Korea 
since April, 1961. 
24soon Sung Cho, 11 Japan 1s Two Korea Policy and the Problems of 
Korean Unification," Asian Survey, Vol. 7 (1967) p. 712. 
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Chart 2 
JaEan's Trade With the ReEublic of Korea and .the Democrati~ PeoEle's 
ReEublic of Korea (in millions of.United States dollars)25 
Exports to: 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
ROK 100 126 138 . 160 109 180 
DPRK 1 4.5 4.9 5.3 11.2 16.5 
Imports to: 
ROK 18.5 22 28 27 42 41 
DPRK 0 3.5 4.6 9.4 20.2 14. 7 
The trade figures for 1971 show that Japan exported 100,000,000 
dollars worth of goods to North Korea; export to South Korea was in the 
vacinity of 285,000,000 dollars. Japan has become one of North Korea's 
largest trading partners outside the communist bloc. 26 Most trade has 
been non-government sponsored. The marked growth in the number of 
Japanese visitors to North Korea in the past few years, particularly in 
1972, reflected Pyongyang's mounting interest in improving relations 
with Tokyo. Most beneficial from Pyongyang's point of view, was the 
visit of a delegation of the Dietmen's League for Promotion of Japan-
Korea Friendship in January of 1972. Led by Kuna Chuji, member of the 
House of Representatives from the Liberal Democratic Party, the delega-
tion included eleven members of the Japanese Diet representing all 
political parties. On January 23, a trade agreement was signed between 
25 Ibid., p. 713. 
26statistics of Forei n Trade (Organization for Economic CooEeration 
and DeveloEment Countries , Series A, Overall Trade by Countries, United 
Nations Publicatibns (1972-1973), p. 199. 
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the League and the Democratic People 1 s Republic of Korea Committee for 
Promotion of International Trade, under which North Korea was to export 
to Japan various machine tools, raw materials, and foodstuffs in 
exchange for Japanese capital equipment, chemical goods, bearings, auto-
mobiles, and steel. The joint communique expressed hope that there 
would be closer economic relations between the two countries and an 
early resumption of diplomatic relations. Both sides envisaged annual 
trade to rise to 500 million dollars by 1976. 
This sudden bid to boost its trade with North Korea was in reality 
a defacto normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. 
The agreement also entailed the opening of a North Korean trade office 
in Japan and the inaugration of regular shipping services between the 
two countries. One can compare this memorandum trade agreement to an 
earlier non-government trade agreement between Japan and China, which 
resulted in major Japanese corporations winding down their South Korean 
operations to shift their emphasis to the China market. 27 
Seoul has been reluctantly tolerant of the Sino-Japanese trade 
agreements. However, South Korean reaction to the North Korean-
Japanese trade agreement was very negative. Governmental criticism 
surfaced in the guise of a futile warning from South Korean Culture and 
Information Minister Chu Yung Yun, stating that if the Japanese Govern-
ment failed to take voluntary steps to prevent the implementation of the 
agreement the South Korean Government would take due counter measures. 
The issuing of this statement by the South Korean Culture and Informa-
tion Minister instead of the foreign Minister demonstrated Seoul 1 s 
27 Kim Sam-0, 11 South Korea Eyes North, 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 75 (4 March 1972), pp. 65-66. 
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concern not to alienate the Japanese. South Korea 1s dependency on 
Japanese capital require that Japan not shift its trade emphasis to the 
North. The threat was harmless, but it does document South Korea 1s 
increasing agitation over Japanese ties to North Korea. 28 
The increasing Japanese-North Korean ties underlined three 
important assumptions about Japan 1s Korea policy. First, the Japanese 
government officially recognized the Government of South Korea as 
the only lawful government in Korea. However, the national interests 
of Japan dictated that Japan pursue a two-Koreas policy. Trade 
contacts with North Korea soothed some of the Japanese government 1 s 
left-wing opposition, thus contributing to a degree to domestic stabil-
ity for Japan on the Korean issue. Japan 1 s concern also may have 
stemmed from its own security interests. Japan felt much safer with 
a divided Korea rather than a neutralized and unified one, as long as 
South Korea remained a free nation maintaining friendly relations 
with Japan. Japan was concerned with stability on the Korean peninsula 
and in the long run it could be expected to support a policy which 
would most likely achieve this objective. Presently, the rationale 
behind Japan 1 s two-Koreas policy is that a renunciation of it would 
antagonize the Korean people and would increase tension in Northeast 
Asia which would destablize the area. Second. the recognition of the 
South Korean government does not. automatically preclude the future 
recognition of the North Korean government. Third, since Japan 
could not ignore the de facto existence of North Korea, it was 
desirable to maintain some relations, either formal or informal with 
28Kaj i Nakamura, 11 Korean Rumble Over Japan, 11 Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 75 (Feb. 12, 1972), pp. 33-34. -
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North Korea. 29 The maintenance of s.uch relations enabled the construe-
tion of communication channels whi.ch a,ided in· the resolution of con ... 
flicts between the two nations. No state can be a nation unto itself, 
and the pressures of finate resourceg gives rise to global enterprises 
that have been made .possi.bl e by cheap .communications and. a changing 
va 1 ue system. ~q .. Japan .1 i ves in an interdependent world, which has been 
continually reduced .in size due to communication and transportation 
advances. In this type of environment, it was considered impractical 
not to maintain some type .of relations with all nations. 
Foreign Minister Toshia Kimura -recently handed Seoul yet another 
shock. In a statement made on August 30, 1974, Kimura virtually amended 
the Nixon-Sato communique of 1969, by broadening Japan's area of inter-
est to the entire Korean peninsula. This statement indicated a change 
in Japan's one-sided commitment to South Korea and attempted to enlarge 
the opportunities for contacts with North Korea. There were two reasons 
for advocating a change in the Nixon-Sato reflections on Asian security; 
first, the relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula, and secondly, 
the detente the United States was enjoying with the Soviet Union and 
China. 31 
Increasing communication between North Korea and Japan was also 
tied to anti-Japanese feelings in South Korea. This anti-Japanese 
feeling was strongly demonstrated in Seoul due to the assassination 
attempt on President Park by a Japanese of Korean extraction, in August 
29soon Sung Cho, pp. 703-104. 
30Modelski, George, Principles of World Politics (New York, 1972), 
p. 244. 
31 The Christian Science Monitor (6 September 1974), p. 2. 
of 1974. The continued political repression· in· South Korea was also 
placing a strain on Japanese-ROK relations. -Japan seemed to be moving 
toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea. 
Japan entered into agreements with North· Korea· repatriating almost 
100,000 Korean residents of.,Japan.back to North Korea, much to Seoul's 
distress. 32 
The South denounced these transactions, but Tokyo was more intent 
35 
on improving relations with Pyongyang than perpetuating the fiction of 
Seoul's control of the entire peninsula. Kim 11-Sung suggested an 
approach to Japan's dilemma. He implied that the abrogation of the 
Japanese-Republic of Korea Treaty, in which Japan recognized the ROK as 
the only legitimate government in Korea, would not be a pre-requisite 
for the normalization of relations between the two states. Kim said 
that if Japan would deal with North Korea in spite of the treaty, then 
it would signify a defacto nullification of the article dealing with the 
ROK's legitimacy. This indicates that North Korea was willing to make 
reasonable concessions to Japan in order to facilitate the normalization 
of relations. 33 
North Korea seemed to be in the process of changing its inter-
national image. The numerous border incidents which have been constant 
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas have been 
reduced to a negligible amount (see Chart 3). 
32Donald Hellmann, Japan and East Asia (New York, 1972), p. 74. 
· 33The Christian Science Monitor (6 September 1974), p. 2. 
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Chart 3. North Korean Subversive Activity (1965..,72). 34 
Incidents 1965. 1966 1967. 1968· . 1969· 1970 1971 1972 1973 
South of the DMZ 42 37 445 486 87 66 37 0 2 
Inside ROK 17 13 121 143 24 47 10 0 0 
Exchanges of fire 
in the DMZ 23 19 122 236 55 42 31 0 2 
Exchanges of fire 
inside ROK .6 11 96 120 22 26 6 0 0 
Subversive activities and incidents in the DMZ showed adecline in 
1970 and continued to decline through 1973. This period coincides with 
major policy reorientations on the Dominant Level of the International 
Environment and increased communication between the two Koreas, as a 
result of these policy reorientations. During 1974, there was not any 
substantial increase in Armistice violations over 1973. Only four major 
incidents occurred south of the DMZ. On February 15, two North Korean 
gunboats sank a Republic of Korea fishing boat and captured another in 
the Yellow Sea about 40 miles off North Korea. An incident of this type 
in this area was nothing new, since the area had been a source of dis-
pute since 1955. Another major incident took place on May 9, when two 
United States Army helicopters were fired on by North Korean artillery 
as they were flying a routine operational mission near the demilitarized 
34Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies, 11 Problems 
of Communism, Vol. 22 (Jan. 1973), p. 61. (The 1973 figures come from 
the Report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation 




zone. The next incident occurred on May 20, when a North Korean 
infiltrator was discovered.on a small island off South Korea (Nam!on). 
In the ensuing battle to capture him, a policeman and· three other South 
Koreans were killed. The incident .hardly· illustrated new North Korean 
aggression; the culprit was simply a spy of-the sort used by both Koreas 
in unknown numbers. 35 . North .Korean and South·Korean gunboats clashed 
again on June 28, when a ROKPatrol boat-was sunk· by three North Korean 
vessels in a sea battle off the east coast·just south of the North 
Korean border. South Korea accused the North of an unprovoked attack, 
claiming that its ship was in international waters, The government 1 of 
\ 
North Korea countered that the vessel had violated North Korean waters 
and was sunk in self-defense. 36 
United States intelligence authorities have not viewed these inci-
dents as evidence that North Korea has again embarked on a policy of 
increased military activity. They believe that Pyongyang had come to 
the realization that its previous acts of bellicosity were counterpro-
ductive. South Korea made use of the North Korean threat to press the 
United States for substantial increases in arms aid. A review of the 
1974 incidents reveals that they were all· low· key, and could not be 
considered a reversal of the low-incident trends set in 1971 - 1973. 
The low-incident rate between North and South Korea from 1971 to 
1973 was instrumental in bringing about the United Nations General 
Assembly vote on November 28, 1973 to dissolve the United Nation 
3511 The Dividends of Fear, 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 85, 
No. 30 (August 2, 1974), pp. 23-24. 
3611Armistice Violations, 11 Facts on File, Vol. 34 (1974), p. 133, 
542. 
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Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. However, 
the United Nations Command in Korea remained intact, Ambassador Scali 
pointed out that United States' Military forces in South Korea were 
there on the basis of a bilateral agreement-between the United States 
and the Republic of Korea in accordancewitharticle 51 of the United 
4 
Nations Charter. Ambassador Scali clarified· the United States' position 
and said that these forces would not be withdrawn from South Korea with-
out ~ ~t..equest from the Republic of Korea. 37 
During the past four years, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea has been busy creating a new image in an attempt to gain inter-
national recognition at the expense of the Seoul government. The 
reduction of armistice violations since 1971 has been part of Pyongyang's 
strategy. These tactics began to pay off in March of 1973 when Sweden 
decided to recognize both Koreas. Sweden announced in early April that 
it would recognize North Korea, and Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Iceland followed suit. 38 Malaysia, India and others did so later. 
Seoul was seriously upset about the actions of these countries, and in 
protest it called home its ambassadors without rupturing relations. 
All had returned by January, 1974. 
North Korea's efforts to seek recognition were not limited to the 
expansion of its diplomatic relations. On March 30, 1973, it applied 
for membership in the United Nation's World Health Organization. It 
seems to have been following the lead of the People's Republic of China 
3711 Statements made by Ambassador John Scali before the United 
Nations General Assembly, 11 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 69 pt. 2 
(October-December, 1973), pp. 773-776. 
38s. D. Koh, "North Korea: Old Goals and New Realities," Asian 
Survey, Vol. 14 pL 1 (January .. June, 1974), p. 40. 
39 
by ending its boycott of the United Nations. Its application was pro-
cessed by the General Assembly and, it was given a seat on the World 
Health Organization in May. Soon after in June· of 1973, Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim granted North .Korea-observer statu~ at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York .. The United States, who does not 
maintain diplomatic relations with North· Korea, issued the necessary 
visas to the North Korean delegation. 39 As the international environ-
ment changes, as a result of the thaw· in cold-war alliances, more 
western states wi.11 recog.ni ze North Korea and it wi 11 attempt to become 
~~,x;:.e active in world organizations in the hope of isolating South Korea 
from its allies. South Korea has already recognized the necessity of 
responding to North Korean actions on the international level. It also 
has been maneuvering on the international scene, expanding its relations 
with non-hostile communist bloc nations in Eastern Europe. This is a 
marked departure· from its past foreign policy of not establishing or 
maintaining relations with those countries who recognize North Korea. 
This policy was based on the Hallstein Doctrine, a West German policy 
under Adenauer of breaking relations with any county recognizing East 
Germany. 40 South Korean policy makers adapted· this policy to their 
needs, and they refused to engage· in relations with any state that 
recognized North Korea. In line with the revision of their version of 
the Hallstein Doctrine in January of 1971, Seoul rewrote the trade laws 
banning dealings with communist nations and opened up all South Korean 
3911 North Korea Gets Observer Status, 11 Facts on File Yearbook, Vol. 
33 (1973), p. 571. ---
40David S. Collier & Kurt Glaser, The Conditions for Peace in 
Europe (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 76-77. 
ports to vessels flying communist flags, except· North Korea, China, 
Cuba, and North Vietnam. 
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In April of 1973, South Korea even made an attempt to establish 
informal relations with the People's Republic of China {PRC}.· The South 
Korean government used a .trade conference· in· Tokyo to offer trading 
opportunities to the PRC. South Korean government officials made it 
known to PRC trade delegates that their government would be receptive 
to any offer from· Peking for trade. References in the government paper 
used the official title of People's Republic of China when referring 
\\I 
\to mainland China. In all probability this was a diplomatic sign indi-
cating Seoul's willingness to establish certain relations with the PRC. 
However, the ROK initiative was ignored by the PRc. 41 
South Korea has not been as successful in coping with the changing 
international situation as North Korea. Pyongyang has made gains on 
the dominant system level at South Korea's expense. However, North 
Korea also has been experiencing an erosion of its position. It has 
been puzzled by the actions of both the Soviet Union and China. The 
Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969 was a specific problem for Pyongyang, 
especially since it had a dispute of its own with China over a small 
mountainous area along a common border, There were some armed clashes 
along the Sino-Korean border in 1969 and the border was closed from the 
Chinese side. By 1970 Soviet influence was entrenched in North Korea. 
Russian trade with North Korea in 1970, according to Soviet sources, 
amounted to one-third of a billion dollars - that is about 70 percent of 
North Korea's foreign trade. It was estimated that by 1971, nearly ~11 
41 The Korea Herald (12 April 1973), .p. l. 
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of North Korea's modern weapons were of Soviet design; Russian advisors 
were presumably available to provide instruction in the use of these 
weapons and North Korean officers received additional training in the 
Soviet Union. 42 In 1972 and 1973 Soviet influence declined as Kim tried 
to steer a more neutral course between China and the Soviet Union. The 
Chinese made major concessions to North Korea in settling the border 
dispute. Chou En-lai also visited Pyongyang and was received by Kim 
11-Sung. It appears that North Korea's attempt to steer a more neutral 
course was prompted by the Soviet Union's increased contacts with Japan 
and the United States. This new diplomacy has not been limited just to 
these two states, but has been broadened to include contacts with other 
Asian nations beyond the sphere of its traditional allies in the region. 
Moscow even gave signs of its willingness to communicate with South 
Korea. Visits to the Soviet Union by a South Korean dramatist in May 
and by two leading businessmen in June of 1973 led to the South Korean 
participation in the Universaid games held in Moscow to the displeasure 
of North Korea. 43 Pyongyang has been balancing its relations with China 
and the Soviet Union in an attempt to play one power against the other 
to obtain what North Korea considers-viable guarantees for its security. 
China has also been a puzzle to North Korea's policy makers. 
Peking has been expanding its relations with Japan and the United States 
and to a lesser degree with other free ~sian Nations. As these inter-
bloc contacts took place, both Seoul and Pyongyang increasingly sus-
pected that their larger allies would seek a fuller agreement concerning 
42voung c. Kim, p. 8-10. 
43sung Joo Han, 11 South Korea; The Political Economy of Dependency, 11 
Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (January, 1974), pp. 48-49. 
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their policies in Korea. The .Soviet-Americandetente developed despite 
the Vietnam War. To this was added the· Sino-American rapprochement at 
the beginning of the 1970's, .and .evi.dence of· mutual large power inter-
ests in controlling the Vietnam conflict. The larger allies had already 
reached some tacit understanding on their respective roles in Korea. 
As this situation revealed itself to the two Korean governments, their 
fears began to focus on the general possibility that they might be 
excluded from any agreement on Korea in the interest of great power 
rapprochement. The essence of their mistrust was uncertainty -
~hri1certainty as to whether they would be properly consulted and that 
they could make their views prevail over those of the larger powers. 
The smaller allies responded in two ways. First, they tried to 
cut across the alliances and deal independently with the large powers. 
South Korea relaxed trade regulations in 1970 to permit trade with non-
hostile communist countries, and the ROK spokesman expressed moderate 
views on China at the meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council in June 
of 1972. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had promoted trade 
with Japan since the mid-1960 1 s and had recently expanded this trade 
significantly; in 1972 it held out the prospect for similar developments 
in relations with the United States, 
All of these moves have constituted a mile form of accommodation 
intended to blunt the sharp edges of previous adversary relationships 
and to prevent the other Korean government from monopolizing relations 
with a given large power on behalf of all of Korea. 44 
The present dialogue between the two Koreas and their subsequent 
44Astri Sukrke, 11 Gratuity of Tyranny: The Korean Alliances, 11 
World Politics, Vol. 25 (October, 1972 - July, 1973), pp. 529-530. 
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maneuvering for international recognition is a direct consequence of 
the general world political situationL. As a·multtpolar pattern emerges 
in Asia among China, Japan~ the Soviet Union~ and the United States 
both Koreas have ampl e·.room to maneuver.· ·The· multipol ar environment 
frees both nations from restrictive cold-war alliances; they are free 
to choose their own destiny according to· their· wishes. With this new 
freedom comes an increased interest in achieving international recogni-
tion in an attempt to legitimize their regimes and preclude the 
poss.fbility of either Korea forcing· its will upon the other. Increased 
:,,:~~i r :~ 
international recognition and participation also helps protect both 
Koreas from the possibility of being sacrificed on the altar of great 
power rapprochement. 
'• 
CHAPTER I I I -
REGIONAL RESPONSES TO A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ATMOSPHERE 
The actions and behavior of the leaders of the two Koreas have been 
influenced by their assessment and perceptionof·the international 
environment as it affected their own security interests. What makes 
the analysis of the two Koreas vis-a-vis the great powers in East Asia 
important and meaningful is the fact that the status of Korea in East 
Asia has been tied up with the pattern of the great power alliance 
systems. North and South Korea have been partners in competing alliance 
systems - South Korea with the United States and Japan, and North Korea 
with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. 
Both Koreas perceived that an American - Chinese reconciliation 
and an American - Soviet detente would alter their roles and strategies 
in Asian politics. They realized that they would no longer be able to 
use the same degree of leverage they had in the past within their 
respective alliance systems. North and South Korea sensed the danger of 
being relegated to a position where the great powers would be indiffer-
ent to their activities or even consider them expendable. 1 None of the 
major powers involved in Northeast Asia wants to see the basic, fragile 
structure of multi polarity, thus far achieved, endangered by renewed 
\awrence Whet ten, 11 The Mil i ta ry Bal a nee, 11 I nterna ti ona 1 Jou rna 1 , 
Vol. XXIX (Summer, 1974), p. 482. 
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hosti)ities on the peninsula. 2 In May of 1969, N. V. Podgormy, Chairman 
of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Supreme 
Soviet emphasiz~d that: "We resolutely advocate reduction of tension 
in the Far East and peace and security in that area. 113 
North Korea 1 s foreign policy in regard to South Korea has in the 
past responded to both internal and.·external pressures; and, South 
Korea 1 s strategies concerning North Korea have been purely defensive. 
This is not to-say that South Korea has not pursued a policy of reuni-
fication by force, but rather to illustrate· that South Korean policies 
have been responses to North Korean initi·atives. 
The North 1s strategy between 1950·and 1953 can be characterized as 
attempted military conquest of the South. This theme was similar to 
Syngman Rhee's "March to the North Program. 114 North Korea was prompted 
to embark on this course of action due to a number of factors on the 
international level. The West had successfully checked the advance of 
the communists in Europe by 1950. This fact, coupled with the Berlin 
airlift, had represented a propaganda setback to the Soviets. Asia, 
however, had seen an impressive Communist advance resulting in the 
retreat of Chiang Kai-shek 1s government to Formosa in 1949. To Stalin, 
failure in the West may have been the cue for expansion in the East. 
A second factor was probably the formal inauguration of the 
Republic of Korea in 1948. It was one thing to permit the Americans to 
2soon Sung Cho, "The Changing Pattern-of Asian International 
Affairs," Journal of International Affairs, VoL 26..:27 (1972-1973), 
p. 230. ~ 
3J. A. Kim, 11 Divided Korea 1969; Consolidating for Transition, 11 
Asian Survey, Vol. 11, pt. l (1971), pp. 94-95. 
4Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland, 1960), p. 106. 
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accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea; it was another to 
have to endure the threats of an anti-Communist regime which proclaimed 
itself the legitimate government of all Korea. 
Finally, the military situation in Korea seemingly encouraged 
exploitation by the Communists. Syngman Rhee's threats from the South 
had resulted in further strengthening of the People's Army. While the 
exaggerated South Korean reports of Northern troop concentrations were 
discounted by the United States, thus weakening South Korea's position. 
The North felt that Rhee's bellicosity made it seem possible that 
responsibility for initiating hostilities could be attributed to South 
Korea. 
The one imponderable was the attitude of the United States. The 
Americans had been virtual sponsors of the Syngman Rhee government, and 
still had a large advisory group working with the South Korean Army. 
But the Communists received reassurances from an unexpected source. 
In a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, 
Secretary of Defense Dean Acheson clarified America's "defense perimeter" 
in Asia: the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, and the Phillippines. As for 
other areas in the Pacific, initial reliance in case of attack "must be 
on the people attacked ... and then upon the commitments of the entire 
civilized world under the charter of the United Nations. 115 This state-
ment seemed to place South Korea and Formosa outside that belt of 
nations against whom aggression would automatically be resisted by the 
United States. 
This aggressive unification policy of the North was gradually toned 
down after the failure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's 
5Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
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military campaign in the South. With the intervention of United 
Nations troops, Kim Il-Sung's dream for-military unification became 
untenable. The advent of the cease-fire agreement saw the implementa-
tion of the peaceful approach. From 1953 to 1961 domestic policies 
were dominant in both Korean governments. This period represented a 
time of transition in which reunification was-eclipsed by the more 
urgent goals of political consolidation and economic modernization. 
The new approach witnessed not only a bitter intra-party struggle in 
Pyongyang, but also mounting external pressures for peace from Moscow 
and Peking. The death of Stalin in March 1953 had left the Soviet 
Communist Party temporari 1ly without a leader. The Beri a - Mal enkov -
Bulganin - Khrushchev struggle behind the scenes resulted in less 
attention to foreign troubles. No member of the collective leadership 
could advocate adventurism abroad before his political position had 
been consolidated at home. Communist China was equally anxious to avoid 
a more direct confrontation with the United States. After almost twenty 
years of continuous civil and foreign wars, China could no longer afford 
to wage war. It is also likely that Kim Il-Sung was induced to follow a 
peace policy by offers of post war economic aid from his allies. 
North Korea was also faced with internal economic difficulties. 
Three years of war had not only dislocated its industry but had also 
hopelessly displaced its people. The war had cost North Korea 3.5 
billion dollars (420 billion won)~ not including the cost of rebuilding 
and repairing the 8,700 factories that had been destroyed. The mining 
industry lost 80 percent of its productive ability: 600,000 houses, 
61953 exchange rate 120 won to one U.S. dollar. A won is a Korean 
monetary unit. 
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5,000 schools, and l,000 hospitals were destroyed, Industrial produc-
tion decreased to 40 percent of the 1949 level, ·In the metal, chemical, 
electrical, fishing, and construction -goods sectors of the economy, 
the drop in production varied from 60 percent to 93 percent. Destruc-
tion was almost complete in the fields of pig iron, copper, alumin 
alkali, and chemical fertilizers production. 7 It is not difficult to 
see why Kim Il-Song needed a cease-fire and why he advocated the new 
peaceful approach. South Korea was in the same situation. Its 
industries had been devastated during the war and the large influx of 
refugees from the North strained the agarian economy of South Korea. 
As North Korea 1 s political and economic situation improved, its 
policies became increasingly militaristic. By 1961 North Korea 1 s 
economy overshadowed the South 1 s as Chart 4 illustrates. 
Chart 4 Economic Output of South Korea and North Korea (1961)8 
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7soon Sung Cho, 11 The Politics of North Korean Unification Policies, 11 
World Politics, Vol. 19 (Oct., 1966 - July, 1967), p. 222. 
8Ibid., pp. 218 - 241. 
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As North Korea regained new economic stability, it began to 
reassert itself more in. foreign policy areas~· At first, North Korea 
had attempted to remain neutral in. the Sino-Soviet conflict, but by 
December, 1962, North Korea had rejected the polemics of the Soviet 
Union's policy of peaceful co-existence and found itself supporting the 
Chinese in their dispute with the Soviets~ ·During this time period, 
! I 
Pyongyang's policies toward South Korea were reevaluated. North Korea's 
new policy encompas'sed: 1. intensifying the ideological and technical 
training of the Korean People's Army; 2. modernizing the Korean 
People's Army; 3. strengthening the militia force organized in January, 
1959, and placing the entire country, particularly the industrial 
complex, on a war footing. The foundation of this strategy was the 
reunification of Korea through revolutionary efforts. This policy 
consisted of redoubling revolutionary efforts in the South through 
continous propaganda, organization, and guerrilla activities, and con-
certed campaigns against United States imperialism. 9 Pyongyang utilized 
the carrot and the stick. From time to time this policy would place 
emphasis on immediate economic and cu1tural exchanges ultimately leading 
to the formation of an all-Korean Confederation by peaceful means. 
This new revolutionary line was reflected in such major incidents 
as the abortive commando raid on the presidential mansion in Seoul in 
January, 1968, the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo with 82 surviving crew 
in Wonsan Bay in the same month. and the downing of an E.C.-121 U.S. 
Navy Reconnaissance plane with a 31 man crew in the Sea of Japan in 
9s. C. Koh, 11 Dilemmas of Korean Reunification, 11 Asian Survey, Vol. 
11 pt. 1 (1971)' pp. 481-484. 
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April , 1969. l O 
The revolutionary .. line of North Korea did·not·result in any posi-
tive actions coming· from the South. ·In· fact· it· strengthened the South 
behind one man, Park Chung-hee, in .hi.s .effert· to modernize South Korea 
to meet the North's threat. Bellicosity on the-part of the North also 
prompted the United States to send v.ast amounts· of economic and military 
aid to South Korea. Economic assistance from the United States alone 
totaled foyr billion dollars from 1953 to 1969, with the greatestamounts 
being appropriated after 1963. Military assistance from the United 
States totaled an additional 2.9 billion dollars during this time span. 
South Korea was being heavily subsidized by the United States, while 
North Korea was becoming increasingly dependent on its own resources. 
Chart 5 depicts the size of defense appropriations in relation to Gross 
National Product. It reveals that North Korea, with a lower gross 
national product, had substantially higher defense costs. 
Chart 5 
Republic of Korea and the Democratic People,• s. Repub.l i c of. Korea Defense 
Costs for 1969 (in United States dollars).11 
R.O.K. D.P.R.K. 
1. Gross National Product 6. 7 bill ion 3.0 billion 
2. Percentages of G.N.P. 
used for defense 4.3 percent 20.0 percent 
3. National Budget 1. 3 bi 11 ion 2.3 billion 
4. Percentage of National 
Budget used for defense 22.3 percent 30.0 percent 
5. Defense Budget 288. l million 700.0 million 
lOrbid., p. 485. 
11 united States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearing 
before the United .States Senate Committee on ForeiSn Relations, Part 6, 
U.S. Government Printing Qffi ce (1970), pp :1584-1 92. · 
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In June of 1970 Pyongyang came to the realization that itts revolution-
ary efforts were not achieving the desired results in South Korea. 
North Korea was also overburdened w.ith exeessive·defense budgets, which 
were hurting its economy. Instead.of driving a wedge between South 
Korea and the United States, Pyongyang's .polkies·were alienating its 
allies who were in the process of normalizin§·relations with the west. 
These factors influenced North Korean policy-makers to abandon their 
military line and publicize a peaceful policy based on a mutual reduc-
tion of armed forces, economic, cultural, and postal exchanges, and all-
Korean elections on a democratic basis. 12 
Defense costs for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have 
been as high as 850 million dollars, 31 to 35 percent of it's budget 
(25 percent of the North's gross national product) though the 1972 
expenditures were sharply reduced to 17 percent of the budget and those 
for 1973 were down to 15 percent of the total budgetary expenditures. 
The Republic of Korea, however was subsidized by the United States by 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually in United States military aid. 
Communist military aid has been much less and North Korea's expenditure 
of 15 percent of it's budget on defense burdened it's economy. The 
ina.bil ity of the Democratic People 1 s Republic of Korea to make adequate 
economic headway and still remain reasonably independent in the face of 
the South Korean threat perhaps was a major factor in North Korea's 
policy shift. 13 
12Gregory Henderson, R. Lebow and J. Stoessinger (ed.), Divided 
Nations i!!.~ Divided World (New York, 1974), p. 80. 
13s. C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification," Asian Survey, Vol. 
11 pt. 1 (1971), p. 485. 
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In the past the isolation .. of North Korea- led· to· reliance on the 
Soviet Union and China .. However, since 1970·.it· had· become increasingly 
apparent that the Chinese .and. the Se.vi.ets.-.did .. not· have enough advanced 
technological expertise to .. meet. the .needs- of· North· Korea. This lack of 
technology has been dramatically ,underscored· by· both Soviet and Chinese 
attempts to increase contacts with, the-United States and Japan, Moscow 
and Peking have not limited these initiatives-to these two states, but 
have broadened them to inc~ude other Asian nations beyond the sphere of 
their traditional influence. China also has been pursuing a change in 
its international image and has become less visibly bellicose in the 
region. It has obtained a seat in the United Nations and has been 
diligently working to become an accepted member of the international 
community. 14 As North Korea's benefactors turn to th~ West for techno-
logy, Pyongyang has been increasingly turning to Japan and the West 
for the newest electronic and computerized techniques. Precise trading 
figures are not published in Pyongyang, but Japan has been becoming 
North Korea's biggest trading partner with a total turnover in excess of 
450 million dollars a year, as shown in the previous chapter. 
During the past year, more than 40 North Korean trade delegations 
have visited Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Their objectives 
have not always been purely commercial. North Korea has been seeking 
wider diplomatic recognition since the old bipolar patterns of exclusive 
trade with socialist countries has been changing. 
Nothing has been done in North Korea without one eye on the South; 
14ooak Barnett, 11 The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia: Implica-
tions for United States Policy, 11 Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 86. 
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the sight of the South Koreans expanding.their exports (and indirectly 
their influence) has not gone unnoticed in Pyongyang. The development 
of new industries in the South_ (_using the latest imported foreign 
techniques) has been viewed wi.th.some.concern. These two factors, 
plus the insoluble shortage of manpower, have been prodding the North 
into a new intercourse with the capitalist world which has made it more 
responsive to international economic and political pressures. 15 
Until August of 1970, Seoul had been completely cool to North 
Korean suggestions that the two countries engage in cultural and diplo-
matic exchanges. Park had previously stated that any exchanges with 
North Korea on a one-to-one basis had to be postponed until the goal of 
internal econJmi c development had been accomplished. In his view, when 
South Korea 1 s national power became superior to North Korea 1s, then 
South Korea would be able to negotiate from a position of strength. 
Seoul 1 s basic policy in the 1960 1s was to enhance its economic and 
military power with a view toward deterring North Korean aggression. 16 .. 
By 1971, South Korea had stimulated its economy to the point where 
its gross national product was 5.20 billion dollars. During this same 
eleven year time span, economic growth had slowed down in the North. 
The Northern slow down was partly due to a period of difficult relations 
with the Soviet Union, its major trading partner and supplier, and 
partly because of the heavy emphasis on defense spending (up to 25 
percent of the GNP). South Korea, on the other hand, implemented two 
15Russell Spurr, 11 Emerging From Isolation, 11 Far Eastern Economic 
Review (July 8, 1974) p. 49. 
16s. C. Koh, 11 Dilemmas of Korean Reunification, 11 Asian Survey, 
Vol. 2 pt. l (1971), pp. 487-491. 
successful five-year planswhtch .contributed to the upward spiral of 
South Korea 1 s gross national. product ... From an:.annual ·rate of growth 
of GNP of 7 percent between. 1962 and.1964,-the·increase rose to about 
10 percent per year between 1965 and. 1967. · Between 1968 ·and 1971 the 
rate· was 12 percent a.year .. i ncrease. wi th·-a· steady· rise of exports and 
foreign exchange reserves. 17 : Its economic· growth was aided by the 
normalizatio~ of diplomatic relations with-Japan in 1965, which led to 
increased Ja~anese and foreign assistance. In contrast, North Korea's 
gross nation~l product had only reached 2~80 billion dollars. 18 South 
Korea's economic situation today puts it ina superior position vis-a-
vis the North. 
South Korea has not only become better off in economic conditions 
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than the North, it has also taken the lead in the military sphere. A 
brief survey of the Republic of Korea•s Armed Forces shows that, as of 
January 1973, they number 650,000 men, the sixth largest in the world. 
In addition it had a home guard of some 2,000,000. The North on the 
other hand has had some 438,000 in its armed· forces, ranking twelfth in 
the world. It has had in addition a people's militia of l ,300,000. On 
the surface these figures would seem to indicate that the Republic of 
Korea had the capability of defending itself against the North. It 1 s 
true that both the North and the South have modern equipment, however the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea has had somewhat more than the 
Republic of Korea. It has 500 modern fighter planes which provide air 
17J. A. Kim, uDivided Korea 1969; Consolidating for Transition, 11 
Asian Survey, Vol. 10 (1970), p. 33 .. 
18August Schou and Arne Brundtland, Small States in International 
Relations (~ew York, 1971), p. 53. 
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support for its 100 .. bombers., while ... South .. Korea has· only· 200 fighters to 
counter the Nerth's air threat. Pyongyang also-has a marked advantage 
in heavy- artillery, .The adv.antages that the· North holds in artillery 
and air power more than compensate for-Ats numerical inferiority. 19 
North Korea's aircraft represent a real-threat-to South Korea. They 
are not vulnerable to the kind of limited attack that South Korea is 
capable of mounting against the North because the North's aircraft are 
stationed at dispersed, jet~c~pable airfields throughout the country, 
. and are housed in underground shelters for protection. The South has 
been extremely vulnerable to attack from the North, because it has been 
tactically possible for North Korean jet aircraft to be over Seoul in 
three minutes after crossing the D.M.Z. and on down to Pusan in less 
than twenty-five minutes. The reality of the North Korean air threat 
has been emphasized by the type of American units stationed in Korea 
and the mission they have performed. The Feurth United States Missile 
Command provided modern, nuclear capable,-long range surface-to-surface 
Honest John artillery support for the 250,000 man First ROK Army. The 
38th Air Defense Brigade provides atr defense-for the entire Republic 
of Korea. This Brigade has been structured into three Hawk Missile 
Battalions, composed of four firing batteries apiece, dispersed geo-
graphically to provide protection for strategic points in South Korea. 
One nuclear capable H~rcules Missle Battalion, composed of six firing 
batteries, dispersed throughout the country rounded out the Brigade. 
The Korean Support Command (KORSCOM) provided logistical support 
services for these American forces, while the 2nd Infantry Division 
19Gregory Henderson, R. Lebow, and J. Stoessinger, p. 80. 
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provided security for the.Armistice.Commission at Panmunjom from its 
base at Camp Casey. The. United States A.tr.farce also provided modern 
jet fighter support from large American bases lecatedat Osan, Taegue, 
and Kunson. This figpter support has taken- up the slack. in the ROK air 
defense picture. 
The 43,000 American men stationed in South-Kerea have acted as a 
force balancer between the North and the· South. No foreign troops have 
been in North Korea since the withdrawal of the last Chinese Communist 
forces in October 1958. 20 The presence of this large contingent of 
American forces in South Korea has given visible proof to both South 
Korea and North Korea that the 1954 United States-South Korean Mutual 
Defense Treaty has been viable. The main purpose of President Ford's 
November 1974 visit to South Korea was to discuss the present security 
arrangements in that country. Atthe conclusion of these talks 
President Ford and President Park issued a joint communique reaffirming 
, the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective 
assistance to repel armed attack against South Korea in accordance with 
the United States-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. He further 
assured South Koreans that the United Stafes had no plan to reduce the 
present level of United States forces in Korea. President Park also 
received q promise from President Ford that the United States would 
continue to assist South Korea in the modernization of its armed forces~1 
These promises made by President Ford to South Korea in the past 
.. 20Gerald Morse," United States Forces in Korea - Can We Cut? 11 
(Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1972), pp. 6-9. ----
2111President Ford's Trip to South· Korea, 11 Keesing's Contemporary 
Arch{ves, Vol. 20 (1974), p. 26868. 
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have been backed .up by mi.l itary atd .and sales to· Seuth· Korea which have 
totaled 244,928,000 dollars.Jn ... ai.d .and . .49.200·,000 dellars in sales 
credit for· fiscal years 1973.. and .1974· alone~·· Frem-.1950 to 1973 South 
Korea also had a total of 31,530 officers-trained in the United States. 
The following charts provides a breakdown ef ·United States foreign 
military sales credit and military assistance programs from 1973 to 
1974, and proposed figures for 1975. Sales and aid deliveries are 
l_isted by year from 1950 to 1973 to demonstrate a continuing commitment 
by the United States to the government of South Korea. 22 The years 
1968, 1969, and 1970 show a sharp increase in sales and aid deliveries; 
these years also coincide with increased military activity by the North 
Koreans. Nineteen sixty-eight was the year of the Pueblo incident and 
the attempted assassination of President Park by North Korean agents. 
These incidents occurred after a substantial increase in incidents on 
the DMZ in 1967. 23 The aid figures for the years 1968, 1969, and 1970 
average out•to 207,902,666 dollars a year. After the announcement of 
the Guam Doctrine and President Nixon 1 s China trip, the three subsequent 
years (1971, 1972 and 1973) show a drop to an average of 133,622,000 
dollars. United States military policy toward South Korea changed in 
relation to its world strategy and its own convenience as these figures 
exemplify. The recent United States military posture in South Korea was 
summed up by General James Michalis before the Committee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the latter 
22Military Aid and Sales Statistics for ROK, Department of Defense, 
Security Assistance Agency (Washington, 1974), pp. 7-18. 
23David Steinberg, Korea: Nexus of East Asia (New York, 1968), 
p. "67. 
Chart 624 
United States Military Aid and Sales Statistics for the Republic of 
Korea (in United States Dollars) 
Foreign Military Sales Credit Program., 
1973 1974 
24,200,000 25,000,000 
Military Assistance Program. 
1973 1974 
132,628,000 112,300,000 
Foreign Military Sales Deliveries. 
1950 - 1963 1964 - 1967 
285,000 0 
1971 1972 1973 
416,000 414,000 1,263,000 
1968 
1,496,000 








1950 - 1970 total 
6,549,000 
1950 - 1963 1964 1965 1966 
1,704,873 125,698,000 171,698,000 153,090,000 
1967 1968 1969 1970 
149,787,000 197,370,000 210,008,000 216,330,000 
1971 1972 1973 
140,471,000 164,000,000 96,395,000 
TOTAL 1953 - 1973 
3,330,101,000 
24 Ibid., p. 7-18. 
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part of 19vl. His statements indicated coming troop cuts and aid 
reductions for South Korea. Michalis said these cuts were justified 
because: 
the likelihood of an overt attack from the North has been 
increasingly reduced in view of the political implications 
that would necessarily involve China-and the Soviet Union 
and thereby endanger newly developed relations with the 
United States and Japan.25 
The presence of the United States forces in Korea, under the name 
of United Nations Forces (thereby retaining operational command of all 
forces in the Korean area), in addition to defending South Korea from 
North Korea 1 has restrained the Republic of Korea from establishing and 
I 
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initiating independent strategical plans against North Korea. Therefore, 
the role of the United States forces in Korea has been that of a bal-
ancer of forces. 
Just as the United States has become the chief supporter of the 
South Korean government, the Soviet Unions 1 s assistance to North Korea 
was aimed at economic rehabilitation and the modernization of the Korean 
People's Republic Armed Forces. Between 1954 and 1970, the Soviet Union 
promised a total of 635,000,000 dollars in assistance to North Korea, 
and it presumably had contributed over 580 million dollars by the end 
of 1968. In addition to these funds Moscow committed another 250,000,000 
dollars in grant type assistance to North Korea. The Mutual Defense and 
Assistance Treaty concluded between North Korea and the Soviet Union in 
1961 became the bulwark of the Pyongyang regime. In 1965 the Soviet 
Union and North Korea concluded military assistance agreements, the terms 
25General James Michalis, Statement of the Commander-in-Chief, 
United Nations Command; Commander, United States Forces, Korea before the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House Committee Q!!_ Foreign Affairs (June 9, 1971), p. 43. 
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of which were not disclosed but they resulted in increased shipments of 
modern anti-aircraft weapons (SA-2), late-model jet fighters, and heavy 
field artillery to North Korea. 26 
A constant theme in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea has been the .Kremlin line of peacefu 1 · coexistence. In a 
February 1965 speech, Kosygin stated: 
The march of the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries 
on the path of socialist and Communist construction is insepar-
ably linked to the struggle to maintain a lasting peace in the 
world. Not only does the Soviet Union unswervingly and 
thoroughly defend the cause of peace, but it also advocates 
the peaceful co-existence of nations with different social 
systems .... This the Soviet Union regards as its interna-
tionalist duty. Experience demonstrates that peaceful co-
existence is wholly compatible with revolutionary struggle 
0 •• 27 
This speech foretold coming events. Policy shifts in the Soviet 
Union have come primarily on the bas·is of one of two criteria or a com-
bination of the two: (1) through the failure of existing policy to 
achieve the results expected by policy-makers, or (2) through a change 
in the composition of the dominant coalition on the international level 
that can only be accomplished by the adoption of new policies. 28 
Since 1945 the Soviet Union has engaged in a policy of diplomatic 
and military confrontation with the United States. Moscow has not 
realized many substantial benefits from this policy. As the decade of 
the 1970 1 s approached Moscow attempted to break the American policy of 
26c. I. Kim, Korean Unification (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1973), 
pp. 80-81. 
27Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, 
New York, 1969), p. 86. 
28Michael Gehlen, The Politics of Co-existence (Bloomington, 
Indiana, 1967), p. 294.- -
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containment through disarmament n~gotiations, trade expansion and 
personal diplomacy. This strategy was aimed at changing the composition 
of the dominant system. The Soviet Union felt· that it would receive 
benefits economically and technologically from this policy shift that 
would place it in the dominant position fo,the international environ-
ment. The underlying concept of Soviet strategy was the relaxation of 
tensions based on the theory of co-existence. It has been the general 
practice that, when any party challenges this basic strategy it is 
subjected to direct or indirect diplomatic or military pressure, or some 
form of sanction. This general rule has been true with regard to the 
Soviet attitude toward North Korea. A specific instance to illustrate 
this was Soviet pressure against North Korea to gain the release of the 
Pueblo crew. The Soviet's also expressed their dissatisfaction with 
Pyongyang's behavior when North Korea shot down an American E. C.- 121, 
by helping the United States ships search for survivors. 29 
North Korea also has a military alliance treaty with the People's 
Republic of China. This treaty was concluded in 1961 and is similar to 
the treaty concluded with the Soviet Union. However, in view of the 
fact that China, since the Cultural Revolution, has been endeavoring to 
readjust its relations with the United States and the West, its commit-
ment to North Korea has been increasingly questioned by Pyongyang's 
decision-makers. 
Neither the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China have 
advanced the same magnitude of aid to North Korea that the United States 
has advanced to South Korea. In 1973 alone the United States allocated 
29c. I. K" s~ s1 1 m, pp. u- • 
261 million dollars to .the Republic of .Korea to complete its program 
of modernizing its armed forces. United States military aid to South 
~rea has placed a strain on the North's human and capital resources, 
since the North's allies expect it· to· pay-for its·defense needs. This 
strain on the economy of the North gives South· Korea an advantage, 
allowing it to negotiate from a position of relative strength 
economically. 30 
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A government's foreign policy is the range of external actions 
pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or goals. 31 Analyzing 
South Korea 1 s actions on the subordinate level reveals that Seoul 1s 
primary objective in the past has been to manipulate events and actors 
to detract from Pyongyang 1s power position. In this context the United 
States has aided South Korea for the past twenty-four years. Today, 
South Korea appears to be in a dominant position both economically and 
militarily vis-a-vis North Korea, but this dominance is largely contin-
gent on Japanese and American support, If the South hopes to resolve 
its differences with Pyongyang, it must negotiate now while it is still 
in the position to do so. The international situation has been changing, 
the United States has been disengaging its forces from Asia, and 
economic conditions are such in the United States that military aid to 
the Seoul government will likely be reduced in the next few years. The 
uncertain international situation and increased international recogni-
tion that North Korea received has strengthened the North 1 s position. 
All of these circumstances have influenced the South in its effort to 
3oibid., p, 83. 
31 August Schou, and Arne Brundtland, Small States in International 
Relations (New York, 1971), p. 53. 
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establish a dialogue with the North. In essence, South Korea has 
decided that the isolation which existed .between the· North and the South 
must come to an end. The .North.1 s attempts· to, undermine the South 1s 
stability through force of arms have-.failed-. Both sides are beginning 
to realize the tremendous cost of .confrontation as they increasingly 
shoulder the costs militarily and economically. These costs and the 
changing international environment have been prime factors in influen-
cing Seoul and Pyongyang to make some effort to resolve their differences 
before the great powers resolve them for them. 32 
With this analysis in mind two observations are in order. First, 
the recent dialogue in Korea was stimulated by international develop-
ments in the.larger region of East Asia. President Nixon's trip to 
China symbolized the end of the cold war confrontation and the beginning 
of a new era of more stable and peaceful relationships among the nations 
in the region. Second, both North Korea and South Korea have attained 
a certain level of economic development and social stability that gives 
them greater confidence in charting a new course in response to the 
changes in their· international environment. The following chapter will 
analyze the events leading up to the Korean dialogue and assess the 
probable results of North and South Korea's attempt to normalize 
relations in response to ch~nges on the international and regional 
levels. 
32syung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, 
1969), p. 119. 
... CHAPTER IV 
GRADUATED· .RECIPROCATION IN .TENSION REDUCTION 
North and South Korea .have .become increasingly aware of the emerg-
ing political, economic and military balance between them. It is this 
balance which makes the resolution of .differences by force an extremely 
costly option. This factor, coupled with the changing international 
environment, has been responsible for precipitating the dialogue between 
both Koreas. Keeping these variables in mind, Charles Osgood's theory 
of graduated reciprocation in tension reduction would account for the 
actions of both Koreas. The theory posits that one of the antagonists 
in a conflict must take a first step that signals its desire to reduce 
tensions. This first step must be one of many links in an unbroken 
chain of logical tension reduction moves. The initial moves should be 
peripheral to national security, since they could be abused by the 
adversary. Each successive move would be in the direction of reducing 
the real threat posed to the other side and building interdependent 
linkages. If the adversary responds to the first one or two steps, a 
chain of graduated reciprocation in tension (GRIT) would result. 1 
Within this context the prime movers were events on the interna-
tional level. The major powers were engaged in actions designed to 
1w. C. Clemens, Jr., 11 Grit at Panmunjom; Conflict and Cooperation 
in a Divided Korea, 11 Asian Survey, Vol. 13 (June, 1973), pp. 547-549. 
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reduce tensions on the international l.eve1 •. ·In· the light of the Nixon 
Doctrine and Nixon's trips to Moscow .and: Peking, South Korea's self-
confidence became strained .. Faced with the apparent inevitability of 
a less visible American alliance and of great power rapprochement, the 
South became increasingly concerned with-its-own security. 2 In view of 
these developments, South Korea desperately-began to search for a new 
policy that would ensure its security as well as establish a new ident-
ity in the rapidly changing international environment. 3 
North Korea presented the largest and most immediate threat to 
South Korea 1 s security. Therefore, North Korea was the first problem 
that South Korean policy-makers attempted to confront. The two Koreas 
are incompatible because of a number of deep-seated contradictory inter-
ests which fuel the confrontation. Both governments claim each other 1s 
territory; they have had no direct positive contact with each other; 
and they are members of military alliances which have sustained their 
mutual antagonisms. 4 Their antagonisms have been fueled by ideological 
clashes which help to magnify their differences. Each side is highly 
indoctrinated and portrays the other•s system as morally repugnant and 
doomed to failure. Both Seoul and Pyongyang have used the existence of 
the other as a useful instrument for mobilizing support, jsutifying 
economic sacrifices and explaining the need for political repression. 5 
2Astri Suhrke, and Charles Morrison, 11 The Koreas: Negotiating from 
Balanced Strength, 11 World Today, Vol. 28 (November, 1972), p. 496. 
3soon Sung Cho, 11 The Changing Pattern of Asian International 
Affairs; Prospects for the Unification of Korea, 11 Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol. 26-27 (1972-1973), p. 215. 
4Astri Suhrke, p. 493. 
5 W. C. Clements, Jr., p. 541. 
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The Liberation Day speech by President Park,· in August 1970, seemed 
to augur a departure from South .Korea 1 s. traditional· policy of staunch 
anti-communism. This first. step .in .reducing tensions unveiled by Park 
marked a significant change .in Seaul 1.s ~alicy-by indicating a willing-
ness to propose and implement innovative·measures·aimed at removing in 
stages various artificial barriers between South and North Korea pro-
vided that North Korea ceased all hostile acts and publicly renounced 
her goals of aggression toward and forcible overthrow of the Seoul 
government. 6 
By March 1971, the Republic of Korea was faced with the apparent 
inevitability of a less visible American alliance. American authorized 
troop strengt~ had been reduced by 20,000 men, and the remaining 
American division was moved south, away from the DMZ, so that all border-
line duty would be handled by Korean soldiers. Confronted with the 
reduction of an American presence in South Korea, the South began to 
consider the alternative of exploring accommodation with the North. 
As events unfolded, the international situation not only placed 
stress on the Korean foreign policy position, but is also became a 
factor in domestic politics. Nineteen seventy-one was an election year 
for South Korea, and the international situation caused the campaign to 
be waged on the basis of issues rather than personalities. The major 
candidates in the campaign were Kim Dae-jung and incumbent President 
Park Chung-hee, who was fresh from a victorious campaign to amend the 
Korean Constitution allowing him to run for a third term. The underlying . 
issue was North Korea and the South's response. Internationally, Kim 
6v. C. Han, 11 1969 Constitutional Revision and Party Politics in 
South Korea, 11 Pacific Affairs, Vol. 44 (1971), p. 257. 
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suggested that the South expand relations with the North. He proposed 
that the four powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's 
Republic of China, and Japan) .should guarantee the security of both 
North and South Korea. Kim suggested·postal~ press~ and sport exchanges 
with the North as a possible first step toward·improving ties between 
the two Koreas. Domestically, Kim's programs·included disbandment of 
the two-mi Hi on-man Home Guard, el imi nation of compulsory military 
training for college students, and the abolition of the Korean CIA. All 
of these proposed measures were aimed at presenting a lower military 
profile to the North in hopes of improving relations. In response to 
these issues, Park continued to stress the potential danger of military 
attack by the North. His chief argument was that a transfer of power in 
the South would cause political and social unrest which would only 
benefit the North. 
When the vote was cast on April 27, Park won 51.2 percent of the 
vote (6,342,838) while Kim polled 43.6 percent (5,395,900) with the 
remainder being divided among the three minor-party candidates. The 
campaign waged by Kim gave Park the most significant challenge that he 
had faced since his 1961 coup. The main issues revolved around the 
merits of increased contacts with the North. 
North Korea responded to the political campaign in the South by 
unveiling an eight point program, in April 1971, aimed at facilitating 
contacts between the two Koreas. The North Korean program included a 
proposal to negotiate with all political parties and patriotic persons 
in South Korea at any mutually agreeable time and place. Another sign 
of the North's willingness to open a dialogue was the drop in signifi-
cant incidents within the DMZ. Figures for the year 1970 indicate that 
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181 incidents were reported while 1971 listed only·84 incidents. 
Noticeably absent from Pyongyang's new program·was its customary insis-
tence on the withdrawal. of .all foreign (i.e •. United States) troops as a 
precondition for negotiation. 7 
What accounts for this interest on both sides to establish a 
dialogue? .Why did this interest· emerge in 1971? In answer to both 
these questions, the importance of external stimuli cannot be stressed 
enough. The Nixon Doctrine, the subsequent reductions of American 
authorized troop strength, the pull-back of the remaining American divi-
sion from the DMZ leaving only South Korean soldiers to guard the border-
1 ine, and the emerging Sino-American detente in the Spring and Summer of 
1971 all had an influence on Korean policy-makers. 8 Korean leaders were 
particularly unprepared for Henry Kissinger's announcenient in July 1971 
that he had made· a secret visit to Peking to arrange for President 
Nixon's China trip. Less than a month after the announcement of the 
China trip, Park Chung-hee and Kim 11 Sung started to explore opportuni-
ties for a mutual accommodation. 9 It would seem that Nixon's decision 
to visit the People's Republic of China, and the significant change in 
the international environment that this heralded, prompted both 
Pyongyang and Seoul to re-evaluate their strategic calculations. With 
the initiation of detente among the major patron states, the Korean 
policy-makers believed that detente would not be risked by the great 
7 B. C. Koh, 11 Korea-Convergence and Conflict in the Two Koreas, 11 
Current History, Vol. 65 (November, 1973), p. 206. 
8Astri Suhrke, and Charles Morrison, p. 496. 
9Astri Suhrke, 11 Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances, 11 
World Politics, Vol •. 25. (October, 1972 - July, 1973), p. 530. 
powers over regional.strategic goalswhiE:h were·1mportant only to 
I 
Koreans. 
This series of moves and .countermovesfiAally·culminated in the 
initiation of Red .Cross meeti.ngs.in.,December· 1971.· ·These meetings 
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were officially sanctioned .a.nd .they .ref:)r.esented· the· first· contact either 
side has had with the-other, outside-of the Armistice Commission Meet-
ings at Panmunjom. Representatives from each country met and discussed 
the unification of divided families and related subjects. This initial 
contact was expanded in 1972 to establish a North-South Coordinating 
Committee to continue the Red Cross discussions initiated in 1971. 10 
These meetings helped to establish the first formal communication link 
between the divided portions of the peninsula, and it precipitated the 
exchange of delegations and accompanying newsmen that allowed both 
North and South Koreans to view each other for the first time in 25 
years. Delegates and newsmen from both sides of the DMZ viewed alien 
surroundings and discovered that North and South Korea still had much in 
common. 
Park Chung-hee responded to these first attempts to establish a 
meaningful dialogue in his 1972 New Year's Address. He stressed the 
need for the government to explore practical and self-reliant diplomacy 
in order to promote national interests to the maximum extent by coping 
with the rapid change in the international situation. Park said that 
it was necessary to establish an emergency structure so that South 
Korea's potential energy could be mobilized with a view toward maintain-
ing total security. According to Park, the maintenance of security was 
10Rew Joung Yale, 11 Korea 1 s New Foreign Policy: An Appraisal, 11 
Korean Quarterly, Vol. 15 {Spring - Summer, 1973), pp. 49-51. 
a multilevel task .calling __ nat .only for .improvements- in military and 
civil defenses, but.also fo.r substantial economic development which 
would increase the .South.1.s .bargai.ning;.pesi.tian-w1th the North. 
President Park continually stressed the-need-for· a self-reliant 
defense posture upon which.an independent foreign policy could rest. 
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He discounted the security guarantees of major powers in view of the 
thawing trend on the dominant system level. He supported his position 
in favor of an independent defense posture and foreign policy by point-
ing to the limitations of big powers in preventing regional conflicts, 
citing the Inda-Pakistani wars and the recurring Arab-Israeli conflicts 
as examples. The peace efforts of the United Nations and the major 
powers in reference to these conflicts also resulted in the weaker side 
losing something. It seemed to him that the general world trend toward 
peace was only an aspect of big powers trying to maintain the status quo 
in a stalemate of the nuclear arms race. 
In order to.preserve its national security in a changing world 
environment, South Korea attempted to shift its foreign policy emphasis. 
It continued firm diplomatic ties with friendly and neutral countries, 
yet at the same time strengthened its efforts to establish trade and 
diplomatic relations with non-hostile communist countries. It also 
embarked on a course to reduce tensions with hostile communist 
countries. 11 
The principal basis of this new foreign policy was to cope positive-
ly with the international situation by strengthening the inner system of 
11 The Korea Herald (January 1, 1972), pp. 1 & 5. 
. ' 
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the nation to present a united front to deal,with foreign problems. 12 
In line with· this new foreign policy approach were a series of 
secret political talks with North Korea·which·were conducted in June 
1972. 13 These secret talks began between-Lee Hu-rak, the South Korean 
negotiator, and leading personalities- in the North from May 2 to 5, and 
continued in the South from May 29 to. June 1 , 1972 between Park Sung-
chul the North Korean negotiator and officials in the South. These 
talks produced the Joint Communique of July 4, 1972 which was issued 
simultaneously in both Seoul and Pyongyang. The communique basically 
proclaimed that unification was a Korean question to be settled peace-
fully by the entire Korean people. It proclaimed a defacto non-
aggression pledge and announced the regular machinery for continued 
bilateral talks between the two Korean governments. 14 This communique 
contained seven items on which full agreement by both parties had been 
reached: (1) three principles for reunification (independence and non-
interference by outside ~orces, peaceful means, and national unity 
transcending ideological and system differences}; (2) disavowal of 
slander or any armed provocation against each other; (3) various 
exchanges in many fields (cultural, medical, and journalistic}; (4) 
support for the Red Cross talks; (5) a direct telephone line between 
Seoul and Pyongyang; (6) establishment of a North-South Coordinating 
Committee co-chaired by Director Lee and Director Kim; and (7) a 
solemn pledge to carry out the agreement faithfully. 15 
12The Korea Herald (January 12, 1972}, p. 2. 
13Astri,~uhrke, p. 530. 
14Rew Joung Yale, p. 51. 
15voung C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (S·i'lver Springs, 1972), p. 
124. 
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An assessment ofthe implementation of these seven principles 
shows that they have not been faithfully adhered· to by either side. 
Item one concerning peaceful: reunification is unrealistic since both 
sides have a vested interest in preservingthe status quo. Theoreti-
cally, the question of· reunification can· be .appreached from two perspec-
tives. The first approach emphasizes that Korea could be reunified if 
certain international conditions existed.· The strategy suggested by 
this approach is to remove the international obstacles to reunification. 
As cold war tensions are reduced these obstacles dissolve. However, 
there is a certain minimum amount of security which China, the Soviet 
Union, and Japan will demand before a viable reunification strategy can 
be implemented. Traditionally, Korea has been the invasion route to 
these three countries. Control of the Korean Peninsula has led to 
control of Northeast Asia. It is difficult to visualize these three 
powers allowing Korea to reunify without some sort of major power agree-
ment to neutralize the Korean Peninsula. The second approach focuses 
upon conditions that impede reunification within the divided nation. 
Internal obstacles seem to have constituted a greater impediment to 
reunification than the international obstacles. As the great powers 
increase their cross bloc contacts, they become increasingly interested 
in resolving situations which might lead to conflict. Therefore, it 
is possible that if the two Koreas were willing an agreement of some 
sort could be negotiated that would satisfy the great powers. However, 
differences between the two Koreas prevent this from happening. Each 
fragment has developed not only its own military capabilities but also 
sizeable leadership groups who now have a vested interest in maintaining 
partition. The longer the physical division has existed, the less 
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likely reunification has become~ because the opposing domestic elites 
have become more firmly entrenched. 16 This assumption is supported by 
the breakdown of the implementation of other sections of the Communique. 
Those sections dealing with slander and increased contacts were the 
first to breakdown. The Red .Cross talks have achieved nothing of 
substance, and the North-South Coordinating Committee has become a 
platform for hurling charges and counter-charges at each other. 
The dialogue began to falter between the two Koreas in late 1972 
and early 1973. In an effort to stimulate the dialogue again, Park 
declared in a nationally televised special statement that South Korea 
would be willing to accept membership simultaneously in the United 
Nations with North Korea. In this foreign policy statement Park also 
chastised the North for insisting that military and political problems 
be dealt with first before progress could be made in other areas. 17 
Park charged that the Communists introduced these difficult issues 
into the agenda intentionally in order to hinder the smooth progress 
of the dialogue. Further, he charged that the North had launched a 
strong diplomatic offensive aimed at expanding recognition in an attempt 
to undermine the South's position in the international community. The 
South had continually proposed exchanges in economic, social and cultural 
fields as essential steps for the restoration of mutual trust with the 
North. Pyongyang continually rejected these proposals in favor of 
reductions in armed forces, suspension of importation of military equip-
ment, withdrawal of United States forces and the conclusion of a peace 
16vung-hwan Jo and Steven Walker, "Divided Nations and Reunifica-
tion Strategies," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 9 (1972),pp. 247-251. 
1711 President Park's June 23rd Special Statement, 11 Korea Quarterly, 
Vol. 15 (Spring - Summer, 1973), pp. 60~63. 
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treaty. The North's insistence on solving these difficult questions 
relating to its national security, without-first establishing some base 
for mutual trust has hindered the dialogue. 18 Looking at this situation 
in the context of occurring events each side feared that the other's 
proposal would weaken its own ideological, political, and military 
position at home. 
By participating in the North-Southtalks, perhaps North Korea 
hoped to weaken the United States• justification for keeping troops 
in Korea. It also hoped to secure a new respectability and status as a 
peaceful member of the international community. On the assumption that 
world opinion was turning in its favor, the Kim Il Sung government 
shifted its attention to the United Nations. North Korea suspended all 
North-South talks in July 1973, renewed anti-South propaganda activities 
and attempted to obtain a United Nations resolution calling for the 
disbanding of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea. North Korea 
rejected Park's June 23rd plan, proposing instead the admission.of one 
Korea under its formula of a Confederate Republic of Kory6. For a while 
it appeared that a major confrontation was unavoidable at the United 
Nations over the two proposals. However, under a plan negotiated in 
Peking between Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai, a showdown vote was 
avoided. An accord was reached in the United Nations Political Corrmittee 
on November 21 which called for continued dialogue between North and 
South Korea. By ignoring North Korea's demand for the disbandment of 
the United Nations Command, and in effect endorsing the military status 
quo on the peninsula, the accord represented essentially what South 
1811 Prime Minister Kim's Press Conference, 11 Korea Quarterly, Vol. 
15 (Spring - Summer, .1973) p. 72. 
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Korea had wanted - non~involvement .of the United Nations in the Korea 
issye for another year. The way in.which the accord was reached 
dramatized the extreme dependence of both North and South Korea on the 
major powers. The United States and .China seem to have dictated the 
accord as if no independant positions by the two Korean governments had 
ever existed. 
Park's June 23rd statement also announced South Korea's new posi-
tion on joint North-South Korean participation in international organi-
zations. Seoul stated that it was willing to withdraw its objections to 
North Korean participation in international agencies if it was conducive 
to the easing of tensions and to the furtherance of international 
cooperation. Rather than charting new areas, Seoul was just confirming 
international realities. 19 Two months before Park's June statement, 
North Korea was voted in as a member of the Interparliamentary Union 
(IPU), an organization having consultative status with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization .(UNESCO). Twenty days later 
Pyongyang won its greatest single diplomatic victory up to that time in 
becoming a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) by a substantial 
vote of 66-41 with 22 abstentions. Faced with these North Korean 
triumphs, Seoul realized that it was just a matter of time before North 
Korea would achieve observer status at the United Nations equal to that 
of South Korea's. Rather than waiting for that eventuality and the 
possible confrontation involved in losing face, Seoul decided to shift 
its foreign policy in order to prepare for North Korea's seating in the 
19sungjoo Han, 11 South Korea: The Po 1 iti ca 1 Economy of Dependency, 11 
Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 48-49. 
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United Nations with observer .status. .Seoul cerrectly interpreted 
international events because Pyongyang was granted observer status and 
arrived there in September .1973 •. Park.'s prier pol icy announcement 
avoided a confrontation in the United Nations and saved South Korea 
from losing face in the world organization. 20 
Soon after the delegation from Pyongyang arrived at the United 
Nations, it scored another diplomatic victory. The November 1973 debate 
on Korea, with both Koreas part4cipating, produced a consensus statement 
urging both Koreas to continue their dialogue for a peaceful unification 
without reliance upon outside force and agreeing to UNCURK's abolition 
(United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of 
Korea). This action benefited North Korea, who emerged as a widely 
accepted state in international affairs. 21 This United Nations Resolu-
tion was particularly satisfying to Pyongyang because it laid particular 
stress on the theme of national self-determination, emphasizing that 
Korean problems should be resolved by Koreans without any external 
interference. This thesis has been one of the dominant themes in North 
Korean foreign policy and the dissolution of UNCURK had been one of 
North Korea's long standing policy goals. After attempting to bring an 
end to UNCURK for twenty years outside of the United Nations, North 
Korea was successful in achieving its objective within twenty days of 
being granted observer status. 22 
20Gregory Henderson, Ro Lebow, and J. Stoessenger, editors, Divided 
Nations in a Divided World (New York, 1974), p. 85. 
21 Ibid°' p. 87. 
22Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, 
1969), p. 118. 
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North Korea was not .only makin~ headway on the international level, 
it was also achieving a limited amount of-success on the regional level. 
A statement made by South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil character-
izes the type of advances that North Korea was making on the regional 
1eve1 • He to 1 d a press conference that: "we a re cognizant of the fact 
that there exists a communist regime which exercises defacto control 
over the area north of the armistice line ••. 23 This statement was 
truly indicative of South Korea's new foreign policy. It accepted the 
reality of North Korea's existence and attempted to structure new 
methods for dealing with it on both the regional and international 
levels. Park's June 23rd statement marked a transition from an essen-
tially negative policy to a positive one toward North Korea. Until the 
1970 1 s the South Korean government followed a policy of containmen_t 
against the North Korean government. By contrast, this new policy line 
follows the principles of possible contact and peaceful coexistence. 24 
The United States responded favorably to South Korea's new policies. 
Secretary of State Rogers indicated that the United States government 
viewed the South Korean proposals as an effort to improve communications 
between the Koreas. Rogers went on to say that simultaneous admission 
of the Koreas to the United Nations would be a constructive step that 
the United States would support. Dual member.ship in the United Nations 
would realistically acknowledge the profound differences which exist 
between North and South Korea. These statements indicate that the 
United States was encouraging South Korea to continue its dialogue wi1th 
2311 Prime Minister Kim's Press Conference," Korea Quarterly, Vol. 
15 (Spring-Summer, 1973), p. 72. 
2411The Making of Detente, 11 Far· Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 
(July - September 1973), p. 14. ~ 
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the North. · In fact the United States. was .prompting South Korea to 
bring its foreign policy more in li.ne with international reality. 25 
Another major shift in the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea 
has been its movement to broaden the Asian .and Pacific Council to em-
brace all the nations of Asia. South Korea hoped that this ·new 
expanded ASPAC would serve as a major forum for all Asian nations, 
democratic as well as communist, to discuss their common problems and 
diffuse their differences. 26 North Korea ignored South Korea's obvious 
invitation .to .jo.in ASPAC. South Korea's concessions to the North have 
been forced by the highly successful North Korean diplomatic 
initative, which had established North Korea as a widely accepted state 
in international affairs. North Korea has shown an eagerness to improve 
its image abroad. Even United States Secretary of State Rogers com-
mented during his news conference on March 7, 1972 that North Korea 
seemed to be interested in improving relations with the United States 
and South Korea. 
South Korea's reaction to the changes surrounding it was to tighten 
its internal security on the one hand, and to move toward an under-
standing with North Korea on the other. As Park tightened internal 
security, the Republic of Korea became increasingly authoritarian. This 
in turn diminished South Korea's international image in the West which 
perhaps is reflected in a number of western states establishing relations 
2511 Press Conference, Secretary of State Rogers, July 18, 1973, 11 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. .69 pt. l (July.,.. September, 1973), 
p. 254. 
26 Kong Byung-kyu, "The vision of the Asian and Pacific Peace System 
in the l970 1 s, 11 Korean Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Spring - Summer, 1972), p. 73. 
with North Korea. 27 
By September 1973 a full year had passed since the North-South 
dialogue had been initiated~ Three.sessions of full dress talks in 
the politically oriented Coordinating Committee, and six sessions of 
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Red Cross talks produced no tangible results beyond a change in atmos-
phere. Kim Il Sung expressed the belief that the North-South talks 
would not yield anything as long as Park Chung-hee remained at the helm 
in Seoul. Kim stressed the point.that the North was not contemplating 
any takeover of the South and was prepared to respect the autonomy of 
South Korea, even if that entaile~ coexistence between two very differ-
ent social and economic regimes. This would involve mutually non-hostile 
relations, with all the economic benefits that a balanced reduction of 
the enormous armed forces that each side supported would entail. 28 At 
this point (1975) the talks between the North and the South have become 
deadlocked. The South does not believe that a strong mutual base of 
trust has been established. Negotiations have dealt with areas vital 
to national security that the South has been unwilling to compromise. 
The South has been more interested in establishing social and economic 
exchanges before reducing military forceso This strategy has worked 
against the North whose economy could not compete against the South's. 
The North has needed reductions in military expenditures to enable it to 
strengthen its economy in order to compete with the South, this assump-
tion was discussed in the previous chapter. The unwillingness of either 
27c. I. Kim, "Korea at the Crossroads, 11 Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46 
( 1973) ' p. 226. 
2811 Interview with Kim Il Sung, 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 
81 (July - September, 1973), p. 27. 
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side to compromise broke the chain of graduated reciprocation. Until 
each side feels confident enough to make major concessions to the other 
side the dialogue will continue to be stalemated. 
The dialogue between North and South Korea can be traced back to 
forces which emerged in the late sixties, which had long been pent up 
by both sides. The desire to remove the threat of renewed warfare, the 
desire for economic development and worries concerning the behavior of 
major allies led Seoul and Pyongyang into direct negotiations. The 
large powers have tended to support these negotiations, and they have 
made attempts to urge both sides to continue the dialogue. 29 
Seoul has characterized the present talks as a confrontation with 
! .l .!i 
dialogue. As each side gains a better understanding of the other's 
capabilities and limitations through continued dialogue and intercourse, 
they may be able to resolve common problems and learn to accept each 
other. Both Koreas have been attempting to use the dialogue to solve 
external and internal problems. President Park has used the North-South 
negotiations as an excuse for establishing a new constitution. A vast 
repression of the entire apparatus of democracy has been justified by 
the need to have a firm base in the negotiations with Pyongyang. South 
Korea has seen how American policy-makers have left Taiwan and South 
Vietnam in weak positions. They point to these examples and maintain 
that the same could happen to them. This argument underli~ed the need 
for a flexible foreign policy and Park felt that a strong internal 
regime was a necessary precondition for this type of foreign policy. 
In essence, Park has been strengthening his position in South Korea at 
29 W. C. Clemens, Jr., pp. 547-548. 
the expense of democratic institutions; he maintains that this will 
better enable him to deal with the North. 
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Meanwhile, Premier Kim has hardly neede~ to strengthen his own 
power position in the North. However, he too has be'en using the 
dialogue for domestic purposes. His main objective has been to trans-
fer resources from the mi 1 itary to th~ civilian economy. Some kind of 
resolution of the differences between the North and the South would 
permit him to reduce North Korea 1 s high per capita expenditure on the 
military. It would also help him to open the doors to freer commercial 
flows with the capitalist world. 30 ... :; 
Both North and South Korea have increased ·their cross-bloc contacts 
in an effort to widen their inte,rnational image of legitemacy. They 
have both made it a matter of policy to join international organizations 
(the North has adopted this strategy only recently), in an effort to 
mobilize support for their policies by widening the arena of debate and 
criticism. 31 
The efforts of the two Koreas to expand international contacts and 
enter into bilateral negotiations with each other to solve differences 
seems to indicate that both Koreas are dissatisfied with their patron 
states and are alarmed that the great powers may sacrifice the entrenched 
Korean cold war interests. This client-patron strain explains the 
Korean efforts to negotiate and provides the basic ingredient of what-
ever success has been ac.hieved. There seems to be a relationship between 
increased East-West talks and the North-South dialogue. 
30 Ibid., p. 557. 
31 August Scho~ and Arne Brundtland, Small States in International 
Relations (New York', 1971), p. 48. 
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From 1970 to 1973 the internationa 1 .environment underwent drastic 
change; a restructuring of relations took place among the major powers 
that created uncertainty in thei.r client states. Both North and South 
Korea were faced with a .security .problem.· Pyongyang ~s peace initiatives 
were probably related to the fact: that·.it· was backed by two deeply 
feuding powers. While South Korea was unsure about a continued American 
commitment. Both Koreas seemed to view the dialogue as a means of 
compensating for apparent reduced security guarantees by modifying the 
security threat through accommodation. Pyongyang and Seoul felt that 
only through a relaxation of tension, and a more flexible foreign 
policy could arms-expenditures be reduced. A reduction in the security 
threat would reduce the need for large arms expenditures, thereby 
lessening both North and South Korea dependence on their respective 
allies. 
Events on the international level during 1974 and 1975 in the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia demonstrated that detente had not 
replaced the previous adversary relationship which had existed among 
the·major powers. As tensions increased on the international level the 
Korean dialogue became stalemated. This seems to suggest that a rela-
tionship exists between the major powers detente and the productivity 
of the Korean talks. As the major powers reduce tension, their Korean 
client states feel insecure and seek accommodation. However, as 
tensions increase among the major powers their client states feel secure 
in their ideological positions and· refuse to make the necessary conces-
sions needed for the continuation of graduated reciprocation in tension 
reduction. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
• 
The basic guidelines for this study were provided by the hypothesis 
introduced in the first chapter. In researching-this paper it became 
necessary to divide the original .hypothesis into two sections since the 
research did not fully substantiate the entire hypothesis. The first 
sub-hypothesis stated that a reduction of tension between extra-regional 
powers on the international level reduces tensions between their 
respective client states on a regional 1evel~ The research supported 
the general contention that actions of the extra-regional powers pro-
duced subsequent reactions at lower levels in the international environ-
ment. In the case of South Korea, Japanese and American actions on the 
dominate and subordinate system levels forced a reorientation of South 
Korean attitudes towards North Korea. Similar policy shifts by the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China resulted in the change 
of attitude that North Korea expressed to South Korea. Both Koreas saw 
an opportunity in the East-West thaw to attempt to resolve long standing 
differences, and structure new relations that would be beneficial to 
both. 
North Korea viewed the thaw as an opportunity to negotiate arms 
reduction with South Korea. Such an action would enable North Korea to 
divert manpower and financial resources to other sections of the economy 
that had been ignored due to the North-South arms race. The thaw in 
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in East-West relations .also provided .Nerth· Ko.rea·with an opportunity to 
gain from increased contacts ~tth·.advanced Western· technology through 
expanded trade relations. Kim understood that these contacts would 
only come if he gave up his poli.cy,of.Kerean. unification by force and 
became an accepted member of the . .i.nternational community. 
South Korea also had specific policy.objectives in mind when it 
engaged in bilateral talks with the North. Seoul was also concerned 
with the costs of maintaining its security, especially in the light of 
recent American actions in other parts of the world. South Korea 
realized that the military balance was tipped in its favor on the Korean 
peninsula only because American troops were· present in South Korea. The 
thaw in relations on the international level and subsequent American 
troop reductions in Korea and Southeast Asia left policy-makers in 
Seoul with an increased feeling of insecurity. South Korea responded to 
this situation by attempting to reduce the North-South confrontation 
through political negotiation. The North-South negotiations can be 
considered the result of a convergence of interests between these two 
political systems. The leadership of both North and South Korea came 
to realize the inadequacies of their existing strategies for dealing 
with each other and also for dealing with the changing international 
situation. Neither North nor South Korea could say that their foreign 
policy toward the other had achieved its desired objectives. 
The North Korean revolutionary strategy had encountered resistance 
in the South, a resistance which resulted from the antipathy of the 
South Koreans toward communism, and the strengthening of the South 
Korean-United States Defense Treaty entrenching American troops firmly 
in South Korea. The South Korean policy of containment was equally 
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bankrupt because it depended on continuous American assistance which 
was doubtful in the light of _international events. Both Koreas viewed 
the thaw in relations on .. the .international level as a face-saving 
device to abandon previous unsuccessful policies and initiate new 
policies more in keeping with.the present· international situation. 1 
The second part of the hypothesis stated that-reduced tensions on 
the international and regional levels affords the client states an 
opportunity to divert their energies to furthering their national inter-
ests and prevents the extra-regional powers from determining that 
interest for them. 
The research indicated that the client states attempted to readjust 
their foreign policies in response to the foreign policy changes of the 
extra-regional powers only in-so-far as that adjustment did not conflict 
with the continued existence of the policy. In the case of North and 
South Korea the structure of relations was such that a policy shift by 
the PRC, the Soviet Union, Japan or the United States created a sense of 
insecurity in Pyongyang or Seoul. In this sense extra-regional powers 
did influence regional policy decisions. However this influence did 
not extend to the point where foreign policy autonomy and security were 
sacrificed by the client states in order to conform with great power 
policy shifts. 
As an atmosphere of detente created a thawing in cold war attitudes 
among the extra-regional powers, the regional powers began to respond 
by seeking cross-bloc contacts and a reduction in confrontation at the 
regional level in an attempt to enhance their own security. Both North 
1voung C .. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1973), pp. 
l60- l 6L 
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Korea and South Korea attempted to expand communication outside of 
their respective blocs. South Korea tried to increase both diplomatic 
and trade relations with non-hostile communist countries. North Korea 
expanded its contacts with western nations in an attempt to stimulate 
its economy with new western technology and decrease its reliance on the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as the only source of 
new technology. 
Increased North-South communication took place on a governmental 
level in an effort to reduce confrontation. South Korea was looking 
toward the future, in which it saw a decreased American role on the 
Korean peninsula. North Korea was attempting to cope with economic 
and security problems which already existed as the result of the Sino-
Soviet rift and the thawing of attitudes on the international level. 
In the past, both Kim and Park had looked on as the great powers sought 
to resolve regional conflicts without showing any concern for the 
regional interests of the parties involved. The Indochina situation, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Inda-Pak conflict were all situations 
where one or the other major power decided that it was no longer in its 
national interest to support its client state. This non-support resulted 
in that client state having an unfavorable decision imposed upon it. 
In retrospect, both North and South Korean policy-makers decided to 
change their structure of relations in an attempt to increase their 
political potential in the international environment. In conjunction 
with this strategy both Koreas decided that their prior policies of 
confrontation were detrimental to their national interests. An atmos-
phere of coexistence emerged that could later expand into acceptance 
of the idea that two Koreas can exist. As confrontation diminishes 
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between North and South Korea and as trade and diplomatic contacts are 
increased by both states, reliance on the extra-regional powers for 
total economic and.military security will decrease. As cohesion in 
these two areas decrease, North and South Korea-will become increasingly 
free from great power pressure to conform· to bloc policies. 
It is anticipated that if these trends continue a solution to the 
Korean problem similar to the German solution will be worked out by 
Seoul and Pyongyang. Such a solution would probably be acceptable to 
the extra-regional powers. The present breakdown in the dialogue is not 
a result of international pressure, rather it stems from the clash of 
two dictatorships. As soon as one or the other of the Koreas again 
perceives danger from the restructuring of the international environment, 
and as a result makes the necessary concessions, the dialogue will 
continueo 
Both Koreas have had to increasingly fend for themselves, because 
the present international climate tends largely to favor perpetuation 
of the status quo. Each of the four· powers directly interested in what 
is happening in the peninsula - the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the 
United States - theoretically backs one or the other of the two Korean 
regimes, but hopes even more ardently that its immediate rival doesn't 
benefit from a change in the present system. 2 A resolution of the 
Korean problem with both North and South Korea accepting each other as 
separate states will not alter the status quo, therefore, it would most 
likely be supported by the major powers. 
The main stumbling bloc in this regard is the Korean nationalism of 
2The Manchester Guardian (September 28, 1974), p. 6. 
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both regimes. As both Koreas rule out political and military solutions 
to the reunification problem:, they will become increasingly receptive 
to the reality of the continued existence of two Koreas in the inter-
national environment. 
Certain aspects in the conduct of. foreign policy are by necessity 
secret, so that the study of foreign, policy· interactions often presents 
problems to the investigator. The fact that all the variables influen-
cing the formulation and implementation of foreign policy are not 
readily discernible makes it difficult to analyze the precipitant force 
in the restructuring of a state 1 s relations with other political systems. 
This circumstance made it difficult for the investigator to accumulate 
more than cause and effect documentation in support of the hypothesis. 
As a result of the secrecy aspects of certain foreign policy decisions 
it is difficult to determine whether the actions of client states 
reflect independent policy initiatives on their part, or pressures which 
the extra-regional powers applied behind the scenes on their respective 
client states. 
Furthermore, the single case study method also presents a problem 
in that it limits the universal applicability of a hypothesis. Generally 
a single case study confirms or nullifies a hypothesis only for a speci-
fic situation. This study confirmed the first sub-hypothesis, namely a 
reduction of tension between extra-regional powers on the international 
level reduces tensions between their respective client states on a 
regional level. However, for reasons already suggested, it did not 
substantiate the second sub-hypothesis, that is, reduced tensions on the 
international and regional levels affords the client states an opportun-
ity to divert their energies to furthering their national interests and 
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prevents the extra-regional .powers .from determining that interest for 
them. Therefore, in order for the hypothesis to have broader applica-
bility, it should be tested for several other-similar situations. It 
should also be noted that the recent nature of events under discussion 
in this paper limited the availability of- research materials. 
In defense of this study, however, it can be said that the use of 
the single case study method facilitated the analysis of the problems 
in question. In this case study, the subordinate system focus performed 
at least two basic functions: first) a systems approach set limits on 
the foreign policy choices of all actors within it. It points to the 
fact that a state's foreign policy is the product of external as well as 
internal conditions. Second, this approach helps to clarify actions 
taken by a state on a level lower than the dominant system focus. The 
international system is composed of individual states who act and re-act; 
the dominant system focus distorts these actions and makes it difficult 
to determine how states on the subordinate level react to changes in the 
surrounding international environment. 
A .SELECTED. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
11 Address ·Before the United .Nations.General Assembly by George Marshall. 11 
De artment of State Bulletin~ .Vol. .. 17·. (Washington~. D.C., September 
28, 1947 ' pp. 618-625 .. 
, 
Al 1 en, Richard C., Korea 1 s __ Syngman .. Rhee. ·.Rutland: p Tuttle Publishers, 
1960. 
11 America and Asia. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 (Hong Kong, 
July 9, 1973), pp:-3-9. . . 
11 Armistice Violations. 11 Facts on File, Vol. 34 (New York, 1974), 
p. 133, p. 542. ---
Barnett, Doak. 11The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia: Implications 
for United States Policy. 11 Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), pp. 
73-86. 
Clemens, W. C. Jr. 11 Grit at Panmunjon: Conflict and Cooperation in a 
Divided Korea. 11 Asian Survey, Vol. 13 (June, 1973), pp. 531-559. 
Collier, David S. and K. Glaser. The Conditi.ons for Peace in Europe. 
Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 
Friedman, J. R., Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen. Alliance in 
International Politics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970. 
Gehlen, Michael. The Politics of Coexistence. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1967. ---
Goodrich, Leland. Korea: A Study of.United States Policy in the United 
Nations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. 
Han, Y. C. 11 1969 Constitutional Revision and Party Politics in South 
Korea. 11 Pacific Affairs, Vol.. 44 (Summer, 1971), pp. 242-258. 
Hellmann, David. Japan and East Asia. New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1972. 
Henderson, G., R. Lebow, and J. Stoessenger. Divided Nations in a 
Divided World. New York: Mckay Publishers, 1974. 
Hinton, Harold. China's Turbulent Quest. London: Macmillan Company, 
1970. 
90 
11 Interview with Kim Il Sung. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 
(Hong Kong, July - September, 1973), pp. 27-28. 
91 
Jo, Yung-hwar1 and Steven Walker. 11 Divided Nations and Reunification 
Strategies. 11 Journal of Peace Research,-Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 247-259. - ' 
Jones, Alan M. United States Foreign Pe Hey· in-,!· Changing World. 
New York: Mckay, 1973. · 
Kaji Nakamure. 11 Korean Rumble Over Japan. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 75 (Hong Kong, February 12, 1972), pp.33-34. 
Kim, C. I. Korean- Unification. Kalamazoo: Korean Research Publica~ 
tions, 1973. 
Kim, C. I. 11 Korea at the Crossroads. 11 ·Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46 
(Summer, 1973), pp. 218-231. 
Kim, J. A. 11 Divided Korea 1969: Consolidating for Transition. 11 Asian 
Survey, Vol. 10 (January, 1970), pp. 92-103. 
Kim, J. A. 11The Republic of Korea: A Quest for New Direction. 11 Asian 
Survey, Vol. 11 (January, 1971), 'pp. 92-103 
Kim, J. P. 11 Prime Minister Kim's Press Conference. 11 Korean Quarterly, 
Vol. 15 (Spring-Summer, 1973), pp. 64-75. 
Kim, Kwan Bong. The Korean-Japan Treaty Crises and the Instability.of 
the Korean Political System. New Yor.k.: Praeger Publishers, 1971. 
Kim, Sam-0. 11 South Korea Eyes North. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 75 (Hong Kong, March 4, 1972),"""'j)j). 65-66. 
Kim, Young C. Major Powers and Korea. Silver Springs: Research 
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973. 
Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy of North Korea. New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1969. 
,, 
I, 
Koh, B. C. 11 Dilemmas of Korean Reunification." Asian Survey, Vol. XI 
(May, 1971}, pp. 475-495. 
Koh, B. C. 11 K9rea - Convergence and Conflict in the Two Koreas. 11 
Current History, Vol. 65 (November, 1973), pp. 205-208. 
Koh, B. C. 11 North Korea: A Break-through in the Quest for Unity. 11 
Asian Survey, Vol. XIII (January, 1973), pp. 83-93. 
Koh, B. C. 11 North Korea: Old Goals and New Realities." Asian Survey, 
Vol. XIV (January, 1974), pp. 36-43. 
Kong, Byung Kyu. 
the 1970's." 
67-74. 
"The Vision of the Asian and Pacific Peach System in 
Korean Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Winter, 1972-1973), pp. 
"Korea Normalizes Relattons. 11 Korean Report,Vol.·5· {October -
December, 1965) , p. 5. 
Mclellan, D. S., William Olson, and.Fred Sondermann·. The Theory and 
Practice of International Relati.ons:..· ·1st Edition-. -Englewood 
Cliffs, NewJersey: Prenttce-Hall,·Inc., 1960. 
Mclellan, D. S., William Olson, and· Fred Sondermann.· ·The Theory and 
Practice of International. Relations·. 4th· Edition. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974. 
92 




United States Forces· in Korea - Can We Cut? Army 
Carlisle Barracks, PenO:-, 1972. ---
Msiao, Gene. "The Sino - JapaneseRapprochement: A Realtionship of 
Ambivalance. 11 China Quarterly., Vol. 57 {January - March, 1974), 
pp. 101-123. 
"North Korea Gets Observer Status. 11 Facts .Q!!. File, Vol. 33 {New York, 
1973)' p. 571. 
Olson, Lawrence. Japan.:!!!_ Postwar Asia. 
1970. 
New York: Praeger Publishers, .. 
Park, Chung-hee. To Build a Nation. Washington, DwC.: Acropolis 
Publications,-i-971. 
Park, Chung-hee. "President Park's June 23rd Special Statement. 11 
Korean Quarterly, Vol. 15 {Spring .. - Summer, 1973), pp. 60-63. 
"President Ford's Trip to South Korea. 11 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
Vol. 20 {London, 1974), p. 26868. 
"Press Conference,.Secretary of State Rogers, July 18, 1973. 11 Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. 69 pt. l {Washington, D.C., July -
Septembe·r, 1973), pp. 253-257. 
Rew Young Yale. "Korea's New Foreign Policy: An Appraisal." Korean 
Quarterly, Vol. 15 {Spring - Summer, 1973), pp. 49-51. 
Robinson, Thomas. 11 The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute. 11 American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 66 {Decembe.r., 1972), pp. 1175-1202. 
Rosenau, James. International Politics and Fereign .Policy, New York: 
Free Press, 1969. 
Rosenau, James. Linkage Politics. New York: Free Press, 1969. 
Schou, August, and Arne Brundtland. Small States .:!!!_International 
Relations. New York: Wiley Inter-science Division, 1971. 
93 
11 Secretary of State Rogers I Speech' December l O·, 19701.1 Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 64 (Washington, D.C., July-March, 1971), pp.19-26. 
Shinn Rinn-sup. 11 Foreign and Reunification Policies. 11 Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 22 (January 1973), pp. 55-71. 
Soon Sung Cho. 11 The Politics of North Korean Unification Policies.i1 
World Politics, Vol. 19 (October 1966 - July 1967), pp. 218-241. 
Soon, S. C. 11 Japan 1 s Two Korea Policy and the Problems of Korean 
Unification. 11 Asian Survey, Vol. 7 (September, 1967), pp. 712-725. 
Soon, S. C. 11 The Changing Pattern of Asian Internati°'nal Relations: 
Prospects for the Unification of Korea. 11 Journal of International 
Affairs, VoL 26-27 (1972-1973), pp. 213-231. -
11 South Korea. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 1972 Yearbook (Hong Kong, 
1972), pp. 290-297. 
Sprout, Harold. 11 Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective. 11 
World Politics, VoL 15 (January, 1963), pp. 187-212. 
Spurr, Russell. 11 Emerging From Isolation. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 85 (Hong Kong, July 8, 1974), p. 49-. -
11 Statement by Park Chung-hee on His Visit to the United States. 11 
Department of State Bullet'in, VoL 61 pt. 1 (Washington, D.C., 
July - September, 1969), pp 237-244. 
11 Statements made by Ambassador John Scali Before the United Nations 
General Assembly. 11 Department of State Bull et in, Vo 1. 69 pt. 2 
(Washington, D.C., October - December, 1973), pp. 773-776. 
Steinberg, David. Korea: Nexus of East Asia. New York: American-Asian 
Educational Exchange, 1968. 
Starry, R. 11 0ptions for Japan in the l970 1 s. 11 World Today, Vol. 26 
(August, 1970), pp. 325-333. 
Suhrke, Astri and Charles Morrison. 11 The Korea's: Negotiating from 
Balanced Strength. 11 World Today, Vol. 28 (November, 1972), pp. 
493-500. 
Suhrke, Astri. 11 Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances. 11 World 
Politics, Vol. 25 (October, 1972 - July, 1973), pp. 508-532. 
Sung-Joo Han. 11 South Korea: The Political Economy of Dependency. 11 
Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (January, 1974), pp. 43-51. 
The Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 1974. 
11 The Dividends of Fear. 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 85 
(Hong Kong, August 2,---r9"74), pp. 23-24. 
The Korea Herald, 1972-1973. 
11 The Making of Detente. 11 .Far .Eastern. Economi.c Review, Vel. 81 {Hong 
Kong, July "". SeptemberT973), pp. 14-15 
The Manchester Guard tan, September .. 13 ~ .J 97 4 •. 
United Nations. Statistics oLForeign Trade'. (QECD) Series A, Overall 
Trade .Qt Countries .. · New York:- -United Nations.Publications, 
1972-1973. 
94 
United States Printing Office. Military Aid and Sales Statistics for 
the Republic of Korea .. Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Publications, .1974. 
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings .Q!l Asian 
and Pacific Affairs. Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Publications, 1971. 
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. United States 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Publications, 1970. 
Whetten, Lawrence. 11 The Military Balance. 11 International Journal, 
Vol. 29 (Summer, 1974), pp. 478-501. 
VITA 
Nicholas R. De1Grosso, Jr. 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
Thesis: KOREAN RAPPROCHEMENT: A RESPONSE TO CHANGING ATTITUDES 
IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 
Major Field: Political Science 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Bronxville, New York, April 6, 1947, the 
son of Mro and Mrso Nicholas DelGrossoo 
Education: Graduated from Charlotte Catholic High School, 
Charlotte, North Carolina, in June, 1965; received Bachelor 
of Arts degree in History from the University of Miami in 
1969. 
Professional Experience: United States Army, 1969-72; graduate 
teaching assistant, Oklahoma State University, Political 
Science Department, 1974-75. 
